Preamble

The House met at Eleven o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

LONDON OMNIBUS DISPUTE

Mr. Robens: (by Private Notice) asked the Minister of Labour whether he has any statement to make on the dispute in connection with the London buses.

The Minister of Labour and National Service (Mr. Iain Macleod): I have, of course, kept a close watch on the situation, but no developments have so far occurred which would indicate that any initiative on my part would help to bring about a settlement of this strike. If there should be a change in the attitude of either, or both, of the parties, I would certainly be willing to meet them.

Mr. Robens: On 1st May, the right hon. Gentleman said that he would intervene if he felt such an intervention would be of advantage. Do I take it from his reply that his view is that any intervention on his part is not regarded by him as advantageous at this moment?
Secondly, does not the right hon. Gentleman feel that the flexible approach of the Government and the parties in connection with the recent railway discussions, which has produced so admirable a result, was the sort of flexible approach that, if used now, could settle the bus strike, which, I would remind the right hon. Gentleman, is causing considerable inconvenience to disabled and elderly persons, and hardship, in the London area?
Thirdly, when the right hon. Gentleman speaks about the possibility of there being a change in the attitude of either party, how does he expect such a change to come about? Does he expect either the unions, on the one hand, or the London Transport Executive, on the other, or both together, to give rise to such a change? Would it not be useful, if he is expecting a change before he intervenes, to invite the parties to meet him, to ascertain whether there is any change?

Mr. Macleod: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the way in

which he has put his questions. At the moment, I do not think—if the right hon. Gentleman were in my position I believe that he would come to the same conclusion, after discussion with his expert advisers—that intervention by me would be helpful. But the position may well change, and if I see a chink of light I am very ready to step in. I agree with what the right hon. Gentleman said at the end of his remarks. I do not necessarily intend to wait for the parties to ask me to meet them. If I thought it more suitable to do so, I would certainly ask them to meet me.
With regard to the railway settlement—I join the right hon. Gentleman in his remarks; I am sure the House is delighted that there has been a settlement of that dispute—there is a very great difference between that and the bus dispute. I do not think it is a question of being rigid or of being flexible; I am often accused of being both. The railway settlement and my intervention came about because there was a very distinct change in the financial position of the British Transport Commission as the result of the modernisation proposals which were worked out. I do not see such a change in the other situation at the moment, but if one comes I will take advantage of it.

Mr. Robens: Will the right hon. Gentleman explain a little more fully what he means by saying that if he sees a change, or a chink of light, he will step in? For what kind of change is he looking? That part of his answer puzzles me very much indeed.

Mr. Macleod: I should like to see an alteration—this is the way all strikes end—in the rigid attitude that the parties have taken up. What that change will be, frankly, I cannot prophesy at present. I wish I could; I would tell the right hon. Gentleman if I knew what it would be. However, if I saw an alteration in the present situation, however small, and if my intervention would be helpful, I would step in at once.

Mr. McAdden: My right hon. Friend referred to there being a change in the railway situation as a result of economies, and so on, whereby it was possible to alter the position. Is he aware that there are many on both sides of the House who consider that there are great


opportunities for change in the financial situation in relation to the bus dispute, that there is a growing body of opinion which takes the view that the multiplicity of services within the London transport area is not necessary, and that with proper economy and administration it might be possible to arrive at a more satisfactory financial situation in that dispute, with consequent benefit to the reduced number of men who might thereby be employed?

Mr. Macleod: My hon. Friend will appreciate that that carries the question a little outside my immediate responsibility, but I know that important questions are being asked about the situation. There is also the difference that in the case of the bus dispute an award was made unanimously—there was no dissent, as I understand, from the trade union representative—in relation to the grades which represent a majority of those engaged in the dispute.

Mr. Mellish: The right hon. Gentleman referred to the rigid attitude adopted by both employers and trade unions. Does he not agree that the rigid attitude of the employers, at any rate, is largely dictated by Government decree, and that, therefore, the right hon. Gentleman has a special responsibility? Does he not agree that this dispute is not to be confused with that between an outside employer and the trade unions concerned having an argument about salaries and conditions? Is not this a matter over which the Government have direct responsibility? Does he not realise that there is a great burden of responsibility on his shoulders to solve it?
The Government made every effort about the railway dispute and, by making certain concessions, were able to solve it. If they can do that with that dispute, should they not try to do it with the bus dispute, irrespective of the political points of view? Surely the Government owe a duty to Londoners.

Mr. Macleod: I very much agree, and I think that the House does, with the hon. Member's point. After all these matters are settled, perhaps we should try to define more closely the position of the nationalised industries and the Government in relation to industrial disputes. It is a position of great flexibility

and it causes great difficulty and embarrassment to the Government and, I dare say, to the corporations as well. I entirely agree about that, but I assure the hon. Member that although we throw them about in debate, political matters do not come into my judgment as to the right time to intervene. I think that, as an ordinary matter of industrial relations, the moment has not yet come, although it may well come soon, for me to intervene.

Mr. Grimond: While appreciating that the right hon. Gentleman himself is not responsible for the transport industry, may I ask, bearing on the question asked by his hon. Friend the Member for Southend, East (Mr. McAdden), whether he will make sure that a statement is made to the House about the economies which are intended for both the railways and the buses, and, in particular, whether the Transport Commission intends to introduce new schemes of economies which it found before to be neither desirable nor feasible?

Mr. Macleod: The Leader of the Liberal Party will excuse me from answering that off the cuff. I will put that to my colleagues in the Government.

Sir R. Grimston: Would it not help if it could be made quite clear that there was no element of political action in the dispute? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens), in a speech in the country, made it quite clear that that was very much to be condemned, but the resolution which was passed by the Trades Union Congress seemed to indicate that there was at least an element of political action in the dispute. Would it not help my right hon. Friend if that could be denied and cleared up?

Mr. Macleod: I do not want to go back over old ground. I deliberately refrained from making any acrimonious comment on the T.U.C. resolution of a week ago, although I very much regretted that the T.U.C. thought it right to pass it. I would rather leave it at that.

Mr. H. Hynd: When the Minister talks about the rigid attitude of the two sides, does he not realise that he himself is giving the impression that he is adopting a much too rigid and negative attitude? Would he not attempt to get the two sides together for an exploratory


meeting? It could not do any harm. In these days of international strife a special effort is called for to try to settle our domestic disputes.

Mr. Macleod: I have considered that matter with my advisers every morning for the last two or three weeks. When I think it right to move, I will move the same day.

Mr. Gibson: May I remind the right hon. Gentleman that although the award was made by the Industrial Court, neither side gave any pledge that it would, accept it? During the discussions, was there not a compromise suggestion by the union, which was rejected by the London Transport Executive? In view of the growing difficulties to the public of London, does not the right hon. Gentleman think that that provides an opportunity, at any rate, to begin discussions to try to find some means of settling the dispute, as the railway trouble was so successfully settled—for which I give him full credit?

Mr. Macleod: The London Transport Executive accepted the award and was ready to implement it and, moreover, added a promise to review in the autumn the pay of the grades left out and to accelerate the review of the Green Line drivers at an earlier date. The union did not accept the Industrial Court award, and the strike took place. As the hon. Member knows, the compromise solution that was put up was rejected by a meeting of the men particularly concerned. Frankly, I do not think that that seems to provide a very satisfactory basis for a solution.

Mr. Robens: I have myself tried to keep down the temperature in this matter and I have not argued the merits or demerits of the appropriate claims. However, I ask the right hon. Gentleman, quite specifically, whether he does not realise that unless he himself takes the initiative, this strike, which has already lasted two weeks, can easily go on for a further two weeks, and that during that time it is inevitable that the strike

will broaden, or tend to broaden? In my view, that would raise very serious issues.
In the last analysis, will not the parties to the dispute have to meet round the table and discuss a settlement? May I ask the right hon. Gentleman, indeed, plead with him, to take an opportunity, before this weekend, to call the parties together and ascertain for himself whether there is a change or a likelihood of a change? If he did that, he would do a great service to the community.

Mr. Macleod: We must just differ on this. I believe that the right hon. Gentleman would not have acted in any way differently from the way I have acted. Nor do I believe that if I had acted earlier it would have done any good at all. In the debate last week I gave a string of examples—and I could multiply them easily—showing intervention at different stages, from hours to months, in disputes, and I also gave examples of how intervention at the wrong moment had prolonged a strike. That can easily happen. I go this far with the right hon. Gentleman: I am genuinely anxious to see an end of the dispute, and when I can help to end it I will help to end it, but it must remain a matter of judgment when that moment comes.

Mr. G. Jeger: Does not the right hon. Gentleman feel that during the last two weeks he has demonstrated his strength sufficiently now to be able to lead from strength in calling each of the two parties to see him separately to discover for himself, and not from their public utterances, what their position is, and to have discussions with them to see whether there is a chink of light in either of their cases which would enable him to bring them together to settle the dispute before it spreads further? The travelling public of London looks to the Government for a solution of this strike—[HON. MEMBERS: "It looks to the busmen."]—and the right hon. Gentleman must have some responsibility as a member of the Government, who bear a heavy responsibility for the strike, to do what he can to settle it.

Orders of the Day — MATRIMONIAL CAUSES (PROPERTY AND MAINTENANCE) BILL

Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [2nd May], That the Bill be now read the Third time.

Question again proposed.

11.18 a.m.

Mr. Graham Page: On a point of order. In moving the Third Reading of the Bill on 2nd May, my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, South (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth) was called at six minutes to four o'clock. Although he gave an admirable summary of the Bill, he could not in that time do it justice. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell) rose just before four o'clock and his speech, too, was cut short.
Might it not be for the convenience of the House if a more detailed exposition of the Bill were given? My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, South has asked me to apologise to you, Mr. Speaker, and to the House, for his absence today on other Parliamentary business and he has asked me, as it were, to take charge of the Bill for him. Would it be convenient if I were to catch your eye and put the case for the Bill in more detail than my hon. Friend was able to do at that time, and to treat the short speech of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East, as an intervention, so that he could speak later?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. and learned Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell) had the Floor of the House when the proceedings were interrupted under the Standing Order, on 2nd May, so he is now entitled to resume his interrupted speech on the adjourned Second Reading debate. As to a further exposition of the merits of the Bill, if the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) rises and tries to catch my eye I shall endeavour to perceive him. I have no doubt that any blanks left by the hon. Member for Hendon, South (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth) will be adequately filled in by him.

11.20 a.m.

Mr. Philip Bell: I would have been quite willing to treat my short observation as an intervention, but the rules are sacred and I should, perhaps,

briefly state the objections which I had embarked upon when the House adjourned a fortnight ago. I had started by emphasising that the question of ordering maintenance for what I loosely described as the guilty one was a matter upon which the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce was divided. Thirteen members were in favour of the recommendation and eight were against it. When the House adjourned I was in the course of referring hon. Members to the passage in the Report where the reasons for the objecting members were set out. They will be found on page 138 of the Report, in paragraph 503.
The weight of their objections is stated in this way:
Six of us think it wrong in principle that a husband or wife should be called upon to maintain a guilty spouse. It is a rule of the common law of England that a husband's liability to maintain his wife during the marriage ends if she commits adultery and is suspended if she deserts him. The statutory deviations from this rule may be explained on the assumption that the legislature wished to ensure that a wife should not be left completely destitute. We doubt whether that could happen nowadays because, even if a woman cannot find employment, she may ask for national assistance. A husband may well preserve some kindly feelings towards the wife he has divorced and, if she has been left destitute, it is open to him voluntarily to make her an allowance. That is quite different from compelling him to provide for her. We consider, therefore, that a spouse who has had a decree or order made against him or her based on the commission of a matrimonial offence should not have any right to apply to the court for maintenance.
They then mentioned the question of incurable insanity and stated that they do not contemplate any change being made.
That was the weight of their reasons, and the House will note that they used the rather interesting and old-fashioned word "principle." The paragraph begins:
Six of us think it wrong in principle.
The Report sets out why the statutory deviations from the rule exist. The original divorce legislation was by Act of Parliament, as is referred to in paragraph 478. Before 1857, when an Act of Parliament was necessary, only wealthy people could afford that expensive process. Accordingly, when the question of the maintenance of a guilty spouse came up, there was usually a rich husband—indeed, both parties were usually well-established, financially—and it was not unknown even in those days for the


passage of legislation of a private nature to be sweetened by the promise of an allowance to the former wife.
The paragraph states that consideration would be given to the fact that
her defection was accompanied by palliating circumstances.
Therefore, in a certain sense the maintenance of a guilty spouse was an exceptional procedure. The Report points out that the power to order an allowance in favour of a guilty wife has been used sparingly, and in cases where the wife would have suffered great hardship if the order had not been made.
Clause 3 of the Bill enables the guilty wife to make a claim against the estate of her former husband. That provision was one of the successful features of the Intestates' Estates Bill, which my right hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General steered through this House on a Friday in 1952.
Clause 3, endeavours to reproduce the recommendations of the Report, substituting only for the word "wife" what I. may call the "ex-wife". Curiously enough, that specific provision adheres in the recommendations of the Report at page 143, and it does not appear on the face of it that there was a minority Report. The paragraph giving the original objections of the minority of members said that they thought it was wrong in principle that a husband or wife should be called upon to maintain a guilty spouse, and I submit that they must have been objecting not only to a claim against an existing husband during his life but also to a claim against his estate after his death—although their disagreement is not specified there.
Clause 3 deals with the mechanics of the situation. I submit that it is clear that it is endeavouring to deal with an exceptional case, and many people think that that is not a very good principle upon which to base legislation. I say that it is an exceptional case because, under subsection (4), the court is directed to have regard to a number of matters, most of which indicate that the court must be rather cautious before allowing the ex-wife to make any claim against the estate. It says:
the court shall have regard (a) to any past, present or future capital of the applicant and to any income of hers … (b) to her conduct in relation to the deceased and otherwise.

This provision is difficult to reconcile with elementary justice. Just think of the position in the case of a man who had had ample reason for divorcing his wife—she having proved herself to be wholly unworthy and disregarding all the obligations that she had undertaken—and had remarried, leaving after his death his second wife and children. The ex-wife may then make a claim. The husband is not there to give his version of her conduct. He is not there to say, "I had ample grounds to divorce her. It is untrue to say that there were matters which she did not or could not bring up at the divorce action". In fact, to the embarrassment of his second wife and children, she could go before the court and tell the most fantastic stories about his conduct during his life, which she had never mentioned before.
I may well be said that a court would look with suspicion at that sort of evidence, and perhaps disregard it. That may be so, but a great deal of damage would be done, to the feelings of the second wife and children, and to relations generally. Not only that; as experience has shown to some extent, under the Inheritance (Family Provisions) Act, it is a very powerful weapon in the hands of a wife—and certainly an ex-wife—that she can come forward, very often with legal aid, and say, "Unless some maintenance is paid to me I will pursue this matter, and if I fail you still have to pay your costs, and any order made against me is ineffective."
The guilty ex-wife has two strong cards. First, she gives evidence of her conduct in relation to the deceased which he cannot deny, and, next, she is in a position in which, to a certain extent, she can hold up the estate to ransom. It is subsection (4) which indicates that this is an exceptional matter, for it allows the court to take into account
any other matter or thing which, in the circumstances of the case, the court may consider relevant or material in relation to her, to persons interested in the estate of the deceased, or otherwise.
The effect of this is that, because there might be what is described as a hard case to one of the parties, the whole burden is put on the court to decide not on any question of principle, but on a question entirely of hardship. This is where I think we should get back to the matter of principle. I do not believe


myself that hardship is a good guide to right actions. I do not believe that hardship is an excuse for stealing. I do not believe that hardship should outweigh matters of ordinary justice, or, as the minority put in their Report, matters of principle.
There is something to be said—indeed, I think myself that there is a great deal to be said—for treating marriage as an indissoluble act, and one which does not permit remarriage. There is something to be said for accepting a system of divorce where a marriage has broken down. In the first case, where marriage is indissoluble and no remarriage is allowed, it is according to Christian ethics, whatever the wife did for better or worse, that the husband, and, indeed, perhaps his estate, should be liable to support her, not according to the station in which she had been accustomed to live, but to make sure that she is not in penury.
But what is to be said for a form which, first, says that we accept divorce, except all the financial provisions for the wife, and the husband can be released entirely from the obligations which he undertook, but subject only to this—that the guilty wife, or indeed the guilty husband, shall, for purposes of money, still treat the relationship between the parties as having some existence? I find it difficult to accept that compromise on any grounds of principle, and I suggest that principle is a matter of importance.
Let us look at it once more from the general context. Whatever views we may take about divorce—and we are all agreed that marriages, if possible, should continue, and that that is desirable—can it be a good thing that the sense of duty or loyalty of the first wife or ex-wife should have the temptation to say, "It does not very much matter, because I cannot entirely be discarded, and will still have a claim against his estate"? By putting in these words in the Clause, we remove some kind of check upon that complete sense of irresponsibility.
I myself would therefore suggest to the House, without harshness or Philistine savagery, that it is better for the general community that it should treat guilty wives on an entirely different plane from the loyal and devoted wife, and that it is wrong, in these days, at any rate, whatever it may have been

before, to confuse the husband and his relations, when they come to deal with his estate, with the possibility of a claim by somebody who has been long forgotten, and, perhaps for twenty years, has had nothing to do with them, because that person finds an opportunity to get some share of the estate. It can only be disruptive to the law of divorce, which should carry out its logical consequences.
If it be right that a marriage should be dissolved, it should be right, also, that it should be dissolved completely and absolutely, and that the community and the State should face the consequences of that decision. This is an attempt to avoid the consequences of the decision on divorce, and I believe that it is the worst of all worlds. For these reasons, I myself would not support a Bill which includes Clause 3.
Finally, may I say that it is a matter of regret to me that I did not take such steps as were open to me to raise these points at an earlier stage. At this late stage, I admit that mistake, and that act of negligence on my part, but I felt that it would be almost discourteous to allow the Bill to go through on the nod without, at any rate, some discussion on the views of the minority as expressed in the Report. For these reasons, I find myself unable to support this Bill with the inclusion of Clause 3 and the Clauses relating thereto.

11.36 a.m.

Mr. Stephen McAdden: The whole House will be grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell) for having, even at this late stage, as he himself says, raised this interesting point, when the House was, in fact, about to give a Third Reading to the Bill.
I should like to intimate to the House the principles by which I find myself guided in approaching the Third Reading of any Bill, or any Private Member's Bill. When Private Members' Bills are considered in the House, as a good number of them are, it is quite impossible, or at least difficult and perhaps a little irksome, for ordinary back benchers not trained in the law fully to understand all the implications that are involved.
The language of lawyers is not easily understood by ordinary mortals, and, consequently, we have to rely to a certain


extent upon some other factors to give us guidance in deciding, on Bills of this kind, whether to support them or not. For my own part, I first look at the names of the Members supporting the Bill. If, as in this case, they are the names of hon. Members of repute, whose judgment we have learned to trust over the years, one does not bother to probe too deeply.
Therefore, it is important to pay tribute to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East for drawing our attention to a defect in the Bill, because, as I understand, there has been no real discussion on this Bill at all at any stage. It would seem to me that one of the advantages of our Parliamentary system is that when Measures are introduced into Parliament there is usually a full opportunity for discussion on Second Reading, and later in Committee, on Report and on Third Reading, so that not only hon. Members but the general public have the opportunity, from following the debates in the House and by public and Press comments upon them, to see whether such defects exist, so that pressure can be brought to bear on the interested parties to remedy those defects in the legislation as it goes through.
In this case, there has not been that full and ample discussion, although the opportunity was provided for it. In fact, no discussion of any importance took place. Consequently, that is how this Bill comes to us on Third Reading, and it would undoubtedly have gone through on an earlier occasion but for the fact that my hon. and learned Friend, only a few minutes before 4 o'clock, drew our attention to these provisions, which seem to me such that the House ought to consider them very seriously.
It would be wrong for the House to let it go forth that we believe it is right so to alter the law that a guilty spouse should be able to take proceedings against the estate of her former husband to the detriment, very possibly, of his then wife or widow and surviving children. Nobody wants to see anybody living in hardship, and I thought that the Welfare State had made it certain that the most severe hardship had been taken away from ordinary people; but in this case it would seem that it is possible for a faithless divorced wife to secure, by legal right, permission to proceed in the

courts against her former husband. What I object to is that she should have this right to proceed against her former husband's estate conferred upon her by law.
I appreciate that people may be divorced and still retain some limited affection for and some responsibility to look after each other in difficult times, but a decision of that kind should be taken by the innocent party while living, by giving some indication, perhaps in a will, of the desire for some provision to be made in the event of disaster falling upon the former spouse. However, what I believe is unthinkable is that the House should so alter the law as to confer upon the guilty party a right which that party does not possess at this moment, and a right from which the party has been alienated by the divorce proceedings.
For those reasons, I hope that those who are learned in the law—I am not learned in it at all—will be able to explain to ordinary back-bench Members of Parliament who have not the benefit of legal training why they think it right that the law should be altered in this way. The effect will be what I consider to be wrong—the conferment of a legal right upon a guilty person to proceed against the estate of a former spouse.
I am most grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, and so ought the House to be, for the fact that those who are skilled in the law can find time to give us the benefit of their legal experience on these complicated matters which, in the nature of things, must be far beyond the ken of ordinary Members of Parliament.

11.42 a.m.

Mr. Graham Page: As hon. Members have said, it is unfortunate that the Bill should have passed through its stages to the Third Reading without any thorough discussion. It is an important Bill. It contains a number of miscellaneous points relating to the relationship of husband and wife. I hope that the House will not consider it merely as a lawyers' Bill. It deals with the relationship of husband and wife, with matrimonial causes, divorce and nullity—matters which perhaps draw us nearer to human problems than any other matter with which we deal in the House. Indeed, such matters raise not only human problems but sociological and religious problems as well.
The Bill does not endeavour to deal with any major principles. In particular, it does not endeavour to deal with the rather major principle which has already been raised by my hon. Friends—the liability to maintain what is called a "guilty" spouse. I hope that the House will not, because the Bill may be controversial on that point, disregard the other valuable matters dealt with in it. I understand from the speech of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell) that it is merely the question of the maintenance of the guilty spouse which troubles him. Indeed, if his argument succeeds, it is the guilty spouse for whom the "bell" tolls.
The principle that the court has discretion to order maintenance in favour of the guilty party has been recognised by statutory provision for 100 years. I would be inclined to put "guilty party" in inverted commas, because as time has proceeded it has become more and more difficult in divorce and nullity cases to divide the parties into the "guilty" party and the "innocent" party. Very frequently the petitioner for divorce or nullity files a discretion statement admitting matrimonial offences on his or her part. Again, there is very often on the part of the petitioner himself or herself something which we might consider to be intolerable behaviour which has caused the break-up of the marriage but which itself is not a matrimonial offence.
It is interesting to note that Sir Frederick Burrows, one of the six who dissented from the opinion of the majority of the Royal Commission on this point, made some such remark as that, about the intolerable behaviour of the petitioner in another connection. He summed it up very well. In a dissenting note, when dealing with the question of transfer of tenancy and division of property on divorce or judicial separation, Sir Frederick, on page 343 of the Royal Commission's Report, said:
The fault does not always lie entirely on the side of the 'guilty' party and it might well occur that the 'innocent' party, by intolerable behaviour, contributes towards the break-up of the marriage and is yet able legally to obtain command of the property of the other spouse.
It is undoubtedly the position at present that the court is given discretion in

respect of maintenance, and all that the Bill does is to clear up an anomaly with regard to claims against the estate of a woman's deceased husband. It does not alter the general principle of maintenance for a guilty or an innocent party; it merely applies the existing law to a claim against an estate of a deceased spouse.
The difficulty experienced by my hon. and learned Friend arises from Clause 3, which provides for a claim for maintenance against the estate of a deceased spouse. I repeat that the Clause does not alter any basic rights. It does not introduce any new ideas. It merely allows the former wife to apply to the High Court for an order for maintenance against the estate, and the court has full discretion in dealing with the application.
There are certain limitations on such an application. For example, the wife must be domiciled in England, she must not have remarried, and the marriage must have been dissolved or annulled by the High Court in this country. I think that last point is very relevant to the one taken by my hon. and learned Friend, that the court on an application of this sort might have to hear evidence which could not be rebutted because the person against whom it would be given was already dead. By this provision in Clause 3 (6) of the Bill that the application can be made only in the case of dissolution of marriage or order for nullity in the High Court here, the court would have the record of those former proceedings and would be entitled to refer to it——

Mr. Philip Bell: Perhaps I did not make the real objection clear. With an ordinary maintenance application which is made when there is a divorce, there is, of course, no third-party interest. The difficulty is that when the first husband is dead, leaving, say, a second wife and children, their interests are brought in.

Mr. Page: Clause 3 takes into account, when giving the court discretion, the claims to which the court should have regard. The wife has to satisfy the court that it would have been reasonable for the deceased to make provision for her maintenance and that the court should make such reasonable provision for her maintenance as it sees fit. Clause 3 (4) sets out, as my hon. and learned Friend mentioned, the considerations which the court should take into account.
They are, in general, the considerations which the court takes into account under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, when dealing with an ordinary claim of a widow against the estate of the deceased husband. For instance, the court must take into consideration the capital and income of the applicant,
… her conduct in relation to the deceased and otherwise … any other matter or thing which, in the circumstances of the case, the court may consider relevant or material in relation to her, to persons interested in the estate of the deceased, or otherwise.
It will be seen that the court can take account all the surrounding circumstances, not only of the property itself—whether or not it would be prudent, for example, to dispose of it or to settle it in any way—but also to the dependants of the deceased other than the applicant, his former wife.
There is one other consideration added to those to which the court would have regard under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, and it is contained in subsection (4, c), which says that the court should take into consideration any application made by the wife during the lifetime of the deceased, and should also take into account—if such be the case—why no such application was made. The court, therefore, is directed to take into account all those points raised by my hon. and learned Friend.
This problem arose in a case—Dipple v. Dipple—just prior to the war. There was a divorce in 1938. There was an interim order for maintenance. There were then negotiations between the two parties as to how much maintenance should be paid, but no final order was made. The husband married again the next year. In the following year the husband died and left an estate worth some £6,000. The wife had no final order for maintenance against him during his life. She could make no claim against his estate. This Clause would entitle her in such circumstances to do so, but she would have to satisfy the court that she really was deserving of its consideration.
Under Clause 4, an application can be made at any time to vary an order; so, again, the question of hardship upon other dependants of the deceased is taken into account. In subsection (2) of Clause 4 there is set out a list of those who can apply for the order to be varied. They include the former wife, and other former

wife of the deceased, any dependant of the deceased, any trustee of the property, and any person beneficially entitled under the will or under the intestacy of the deceased.
Although I have spoken of this in relation to a wife surviving her former husband, all this also applies in reverse to the former husband of the deceased wife, as it does under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938——

Mr. McAdden: Does it apply to a guilty husband as well as to a guilty wife?

Mr. Page: To a certain extent, yes, but not in the case of settlements. If one goes back to Section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, one finds that a guilty husband has not all the rights of a guilty wife. It is therefore not quite the same position, but generally speaking I think that the answer is yes.
It is subsection (3) of Clause 5 that applies this in reverse, namely, to the former husband of the deceased wife. It needs a little adaptation from the 1938 Act, because the husband is entitled, on a divorce, to maintenance from his wife only under certain circumstances. That is to say, the court can give consideration to whether or not to make an order against the wife to maintain him only in certain circumstances; namely, when he is divorced on grounds of insanity, or when he divorces his wife on grounds of adultery, desertion or cruelty, and when the wife has some property of her own in respect of which the court can make an order for a secured provision, that is, for a settlement of that property.
Clause 6 contains provisions supplementary to Clauses 3 and 4, and these are much the same as under the 1938 Act. They protect the personal representatives who distribute the estate without notice of any claim of this sort; they allow a former spouse to obtain a grant if necessary, to the estate of the deceased former husband or wife, as the case may be, and the Clause also provides for the forms of orders to be made on an application of this sort. So much for claims against the deceased spouse's estate, and so much, I think, for the controversial parts of the Bill.
Clause 2 is important, as it applies the well-known bankruptcy laws against


fraudulent disposition of property to defeat creditors, to fraudulent disposition of property to defeat a wife's right to maintenance. This, I fear, is going to be one more thing for conveyancers to endeavour to find in titles to property. When I started conveyancing some years ago we had little work to do and we earned large fees for doing very little. Now we earn very small fees for doing a great deal because Parliament has imposed on us more and more duties in searching titles, and this will be one more. Nevertheless, this is a very valuable provision.
The difficulty arose in a case of Burmester v. Burmester. There was a divorce in 1912. There was no order for maintenance, but there was a petition for maintenance in the following year. The wife making that petition heard that her husband, who had then gone to Vancouver, had become quite a wealthy land agent there. More than that, he had become engaged to a lady there and he was threatening to settle all his property on his new wife, as soon as they were married, or even before the mariage, as a marriage settlement. The former wife applied to the court here for an injunction to prevent him doing that while her petition for maintenance was pending. It was held that the court had no power to grant such an injunction.
Therefore, it is the case that a spiteful husband can dispose of his property with the intention of defeating his former wife's claim to maintenance and, as the law stands, she can do nothing about that. The Royal Commission advised strongly that the law should be put right in this respect and that the wife should be given the right, subject to the court's discretion and subject to satisfying the court that she deserves such maintenance as it may order, to apply to the court for that order.
The Royal Commission's recommendations were not quite the same as appear in Clause 2. The Royal Commission recommended that she should be able to make this application within one year after the maintenance order, and that the court should then be able to set aside any disposition which took place within three years before the order. That would have put any such disposition at risk for a period of four years. The Clause as drafted puts it at risk for only

three years; the court can set aside such a transaction if it occurred within three years before the date of the application.
Of course, this does not affect a purchaser for value—that is, a person who has acquired any property from the former husband for valuable consideration, in good faith and without any notice of his intention to defeat his wife's claim. It does not affect any disposition by him by will, but it does affect a disposition by means of a marriage settlement, because in subsection (8) of Clause 2 "valuable consideration" does not include marriage. That goes a little further than the bankruptcy laws, but it seems to fit the case here because the case which one wants to meet is that of the husband who, getting married a second time, settles his property on his second wife in order to defeat the claims of his first wife. It seems that in those circumstances the Clause is meeting something which may be a possible injustice, and it certainly carries out the recommendations of the Royal Commission in this respect. So much for Clause 2.
Now I turn to practically the end of the Bill where there is a rather similar provision to Clause 2 to enable the courts to deal better with cases which come before them under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, involving disputes between husband and wife concerning property. There is, as the House will know, a summary form of procedure under Section 17 of the 1882 Act which enables the husband and wife to come before the court to settle disputes about property.
But there has been this difficulty in such proceedings, that the court has no power to make any order if the property itself has gone, if it cannot be traced. Nor has it any power to order a money judgment. So that, if, for example, the husband has disposed of the property and if it is not possible to trace that property into any other property or into any money, then the court is powerless to make any order. Clause 7 gives the court power to make orders in such a case. If the wife can show that her husband has had in his possession any money or property to which she was beneficially entitled, the power of the court is extended by the Clause to the making of an order for a money payment to the wife.
This difficulty clearly arose in the case of Tunstall v. Tunstall in 1950. In this case, to give an example of how the law stood and why it should now be amended, a house was purchased in 1927 for £720 by the husband and wife. In 1950 it was sold for £2,350 and the husband pocketed the money. There was no property and, there were no identifiable proceeds of sale and the court could make no order. It was quite powerless to make any order in favour of the wife. Under this Clause the court would have power to make an order for a money payment to the wife in such circumstances.
In subsection (7) of Clause 7 a further important point is dealt with, inasmuch as the court will have power to order a sale of property. Where the property is still in existence, one would have thought that the reasonable way of settling a dispute between husband and wife would be to say, "Sell the property and divide the proceeds." But the court had not got that power, as was shown in the case of Cobb v. Cobb.
A house at Wisbech was purchased jointly in the names of the husband and wife. The wife's parents came to stay in the house and that caused difficulties between the husband and wife, as it so frequently does, but they both continued to live in the house, as indeed did the parents. Nevertheless the husband took out a summons under Section 17 of the 1882 Act for a settlement of this dispute. His idea was to get the in-laws out by selling the house over their heads—perhaps a very wise idea. But, in fact, the court had no power to order a sale in those circumstances, and he failed. Subsection (7) of this Clause gives the court that power.
Finally, may I turn to the beginning of the Bill, to Clause 1 which clears up a rather ridiculous technical point. It is a point which is related to the time at which a maintenance order may be made. Under Section 19 of the 1950 Act, the court can make a maintenance order if the application is made "on" the making of any decree of dissolution or nullity of the marriage. The word "on" has been interpreted by the courts to mean at the time of what I would call the major decree or a reasonable time, a short time, afterwards. In the

case of Scott v. Scott, when this problem was raised very acutely, the court held that seven years afterwards was too long and it could not make an order for maintenance in the circumstances.
The difficulty is usually overcome, in practice, by a wife who, although at the time of divorce she does not require a maintenance order, nevertheless includes an application for it in her petition. The court may then grant her a nominal order of, say, 1s. a month. If the wife is properly advised, that is the way she deals with it. But there have been cases in which the wife says that she really does not wish to make any claim against her husband for maintenance. She makes no claim at the time she lodges her petition for divorce, but afterwards her circumstances change and she does require maintenance from her husband. If she has left it too long, the court has no power to grant it. That technicality is removed by Clause 1 of the Bill. The court will have power to make a maintenance order no matter how long after the decree for dissolution or nullity the application for maintenance is made. Of course, the court must have regard to any delay on the part of the wife in making her application. That is provided for in Clause 1 (5).
I am sure that the House will also give consideration to the delay which I have caused it in being so long over the explanation of this Bill. I am very grateful to hon. Members for bearing with me for this length of time.

12.12 p.m.

Major W. Hicks Beach: I am sure that hon. Members on both sides would like me to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) on the very clear way in which he has explained the Bill, having been called upon at very short notice to do so. I do not agree with all the views he expressed, but he put the matter clearly and, if I may say so, he has been extremely helpful to the House.
The Bill has reached its final stage virtually with no discussion on it. In my view, it is a distinctly controversial Measure, and it brings about very considerable changes in the law. The fact that it has reached this stage shows how important it is for back benchers—I take full responsibility in the House on these matters—to exercise their right to make


sure that Private Members' Bills are not allowed to slip through with virtually no discussion. I have, on many occasions, taken appropriate action to prevent this happening, and I very much regret my omission in not doing so in regard to this Bill.
It is said in favour of the Bill that it has the support of the findings of the Royal Commission, although some of the findings were not, I believe, unanimous. It seems to me that nowadays we are getting very near the stage when it is said that any Bill which follows the recommendations of a Royal Commission, which are treated as sacrosanct, should automatically be passed quickly through the House. I profoundly disagree. The recent Report of the Wolfenden Commission supports my argument. A great many of its recommendations I profoundly disagree with, and I would oppose any legislation introduced in the House to carry them out.
From necessity, my intervention has to be extremely brief. Except for Clause 3, I do not object to any Clause in the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Crosby suggested that Clause 3 did not really introduce a new principle. I disagree with that view. Clause 3 enables a guilty wife in any circumstances to deprive an innocent husband's estate of part of its assets, possibly in some cases to the detriment of the children of a second marriage. I cannot believe that that is right or in accordance with our principles of British justice. That is my only real objection to the Bill. I hope very much that when it reaches another place careful consideration will be given to it to see that what is, in my view, a cause for very serious reproach can be taken out of the Bill and so that it will not become the law of the land.
It is said—my hon. Friend's argument was extremely impressive—that of course we must not overlook the fact that all these matters and all proceedings to be taken against the estate of a deceased innocent spouse are in the discretion of the court. That is perfectly true, and I should be the last to criticise how High Court judges and other judges exercise their discretion. But there is always a great difficulty about a judge having discretion in matters such as this, because, by and large, if a judge does make a mistake in exercising his discretion, it is

very difficult to persuade the Court of Appeal to overrule him.
I do not criticise the Court of Appeal for this, but it is almost always said, in cases concerning maintenance orders, children, or, indeed, property, that these are matters in the discretion of the judge. The court does not think that it should intervene because the judge had had all the evidence before him and made his mind up on the facts. I am always nervous, therefore, when in matters like this discretion is left with the judge, although, of course, in saying that, I do not in any way criticise the judges. This matter should not, in my view, be left to the discretion of the judge, although it is quite correct to say that it did have the limited support of the Royal Commission.
I hold very strongly the view I have expressed about Clause 3. It needs very much more careful thought than has been given to it until now, and I hope that, when the Bill reaches another place, consideration will be given to the comments I have made about it.

12.17 p.m.

Sir Frank Soskice: Broadly speaking, the Bill is entirely acceptable to the House and, speaking personally, I would entirely support it. Three hon. Gentlemen, however, have spoken about Clause 3, and I intervene particularly because the House may desire to hear the view of an Opposition lawyer. Indeed, the hon. Member for Southend, East (Mr. McAdden) expressed a wish to hear it.
I do not share the doubts expressed about Clause 3. The hon. Member for Southend, East spoke as if the Clause conferred a right. It does not confer a right; it confers only a discretionary claim. It seems to me that, inasmuch as the wife has to establish that, in the first place, it is reasonable, and that, in hearing her claim, the court has to consider her conduct, her own assets and all the circumstances, even if one takes the extreme and rigid view of the guilty spouse taken by the hon. and learned Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell), nevertheless the Clause is justified. It merely extends the existing law to the estate of a deceased husband.
Speaking for myself, I do not approach the matter in the same way as the hon. and learned Member for Bolton. East


approaches it. I feel that his rigid division of spouses into those who are guilty and those who are not guilty is somewhat too arbitrary and does not correspond with the facts. One has to have a much more flexible approach, and the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) exactly expressed my own feelings about it. Speaking from this side of the House, therefore, I do not share the doubts about Clause 3, and I hope that the Bill may be given a Third Reading.

Mr. McAdden: Am I to understand that what you are saying is that this is a discretionary claim, but——

Mr. Speaker: I have said nothing.

Mr. McAdden: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman say that this is a discretionary claim? Am I to understand that this is a claim that does not exist at the moment? Is there an alteration in the law or not?

The Solicitor-General (Sir Harry Hylton-Foster): May I assist my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, East (Mr. McAdden), in answering his question to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice), because I think that it is best to answer the points as we go along. If my hon. Friend will look at the terms of Clause 3, he will see that what it does is to confer a power to make an order upon an application, but there is nothing whatsoever to compel the court to make an order. It confers a right on an applicant to make an application for an order in the circumstances there indicated. That is all it does.
I am very glad to hear that everyone who has spoken, with the possible exception of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell), does not oppose the Third Reading of the Bill. One is driven inevitably to the conclusion that it would be an outstanding pity if the House were to deny a Third Reading to the Bill because it objects to the provisions of only one Clause in the Bill. I thought that my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) did the House great service in drawing attention to what was done by other Clauses.
The reason why we have reached Third Reading without the sign of slightest

opposition to any provision in the Bill is that all the provisions in the Bill, with the possible exception of Clause 3, are heartily welcome to hon. Members on both sides and it would clearly be the greatest pity to lose the advantage of the other provisions simply because Clause 3 has been allowed to reach this rather, if I may say without impertinence, strained Third Reading debate without anybody succeeding in getting on to the Order Paper at any stage anything that would raise a debate on Clause 3.
It is easy to understand that some people feel that it is always wrong that the so-called innocent party to the divorce should be required to pay maintenance to the so-called guilty spouse. But, of course, the discussion is not about that point. That has been part of our law for a long time and will remain part of our law when the Bill is enacted. There is a distinction between a power in the court to make the so-called innocent spouse support the so-called guilty spouse during life and a power which is new under the Bill to permit the court to make an order against the estate of the so-called innocent spouse.
I hope that my hon. Friends who have objected to that conception will bear in mind how difficult it would be to justify a different principle after death from what can be done during the life of the spouse. The sole difference that anyone can suggest is that developed by my hon. Friends, namely, that after his death a man may not be able to defend himself against the assaults upon his estate of the guilty ex-wife. Of course, that is true. I do not think there is necessarily a distinction, as one of my hon. Friends suggested, that after death the children of a second marriage may be interested in the estate. They are very often present during life, because the second marriage occurs during life and the question of making provision for the guilty first wife may arise during life in the same way.
I hope that the House will take the view—and I speak on behalf of the Government in saying this—that sufficient power is provided for the court to take into account every consideration of that kind, namely, the needs of other persons interested in the estate of the deceased, and that there is sufficient provision to enable a wise judge to take into


account all those factors before he thinks of making provision out of the estate for the guilty spouse. The existing power to make provision during the life of the innocent party has been used very sparingly indeed and I think that the power to make provision out of the estate would be used even more sparingly in the altogether exceptional case.
On the other hand, the fact that that is altogether exceptional is not, in our belief, a reason for not making an enactment to deal with it. It is true that this was supported by a majority recommendation of the Royal Commission, but it is right to point out that the minority desired to put an end to the existing power to make provision for a guilty spouse during the life of the innocent spouse. If we follow the existing law, and do not change it, as is clearly the intention of those who oppose Clause 3, because they made no attempt during the passage of the Bill to effect that change, it does seem an extreme position to take up, namely, that one must not deal with the position after death on the same principle as the law deals with the position during life.
I hope that my hon. Friends who are opposed to the principle see how narrow is the extension made by the Bill in this field and do not feel that their opposition to Clause 3 as it stands could in any way justify depriving the public of the valuable provisions contained in the rest of the Bill, particularly those provisions that will put an end to what I might call ex-spouses' stripping.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

Orders of the Day — MERCHANT SHIPPING (LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNERS AND OTHERS) BILL

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

Clause 1.—(INCREASE IN LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNERS AND OTHERS.)

12.27 p.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Airey Neave): I beg to move, in page 1, line 16, to leave out from the first "the" to the end of line 17 and to insert:
number by which the amount substituted by paragraph (a) of this subsection is to be multiplied shall be three hundred in any case where the tonnage concerned is".
Hon. Members will remember that in Committee I moved an Amendment relating to the 300-ton platform and the hon. Member for Rossendale (Mr. Anthony Greenwood) pointed out that the wording did not seem clear and might be capable of misinterpretation. I have carefully considered his points and I think that the House will agree that the present form of wording leaves no one in any doubt as to its meaning regarding the 300-ton platform. The tonnage referred to is that defined in the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894.

Amendment agreed to.

12.28 p.m.

Mr. Knox Cunningham: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
When the Bill was before the House for Second Reading on 7th February the Joint Parliamentary Secretary intimated that the Government would move Amendments both in Committee in this House and in another place, so that the provisions of the International Convention relating to the limits of liability of seagoing ships, which was signed in Brussels in October last year, could become part of our law. This undertaking was welcomed by all sides of the House. The Bill has now been amended in Committee to include the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention. I hope that the House will send it to another place so that the other Amendments, which it was not possible to move in Committee because of the narrowness of the Title of


the Bill, will be inserted and the full provisions of the Convention brought into the Bill.
On behalf of the supporters of the Bill, I would thank my hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary for the assistance which he and his advisers have given. I would thank also Members on both sides of the House who have given their support to the Bill and have helped by suggesting points for consideration.
If ever reform were needed, this is surely a case for urgent reform. Last year, in life claims alone, a figure of 47 proved claims, totalling £163,076, had to be scaled down to £30,442. In certain cases the proportion of the scaling down was even more startling. Nine of the above claims, totalling £42,876, were scaled down to £3,684. In another reference, three of the above claims, totalling £11,475, were scaled down to £723. In that case, the innocent parties received 6 per cent. of their claims and the wrongdoer was relieved of 94 per cent. These figures and others appear in a Written Answer in HANSARD for 25th March, 1958, column 32.
I therefore ask the House to give a Third Reading to the Bill so that it may become an Act at the earliest possible moment.

12.32 p.m.

Mr. Walter Edwards: I beg to second the Motion.
In doing so, I express my appreciation of the intentions of the promoters of the Bill as a Private Member's Measure. We are all very happy to see that those who are engaged in the Merchant Navy are to be rewarded to a certain extent under the provisions of the Bill. The old figures of compensation which applied were most unjust to those who carried out this very important service on behalf of the nation.
Everybody is not always satisfied with legislation, or even with this Brussels Convention recommendation, but it is a source of satisfaction to those who know anything about the Merchant Navy to read the provisions of the Bill. The Bill is one of the best things that has happened to the Merchant Navy for a considerable time, and I am extremely thankful to its sponsors. Its proposals will not only considerably help those who serve on

large vessels travelling throughout the world, but will be a great asset and advantage to those on smaller vessels.
So far as I know, this is the first time a minimum tonnage has been laid down for shipowners' liability to compensation, and I believe the shipowners are, in the main, happy about it. If compensation is limited simply on the basis of the tonnage of the vessel—trawlers, fishing vessels and ships of that description—it becomes extremely difficult for the men to receive their just payment after accidents and other incidents affecting their employment.
I add my word of praise to the Joint Parliamentary Secretary. When the Bill was before us on Second Reading it was, as the sponsors will agree, rather sketchy, but the Parliamentary Secretary has made it into a respectable Bill. It is nice to be able to say something in praise of the Ministry of Transport, because I very often fall out with the Ministry on other matters. I congratulate the Joint Parliamentary Secretary. The Bill alters figures which have been in operation for almost a hundred years affecting those engaged in the Merchant Navy. I give my strongest support to the Third Reading.

12.35 p.m.

Mr. Neave: I would join with the hon. Member for Stepney (Mr. W. Edwards) in congratulating the promoters of the Bill, my hon. Friends the Members for Mid-Ulster (Mr. Forrest) and Antrim, South (Mr. Knox Cunningham). I thank the hon. Member for Stepney for his co-operation in Committee on many points, and also the hon. Member for Rossendale (Mr. Anthony Greenwood).
As the hon. Member for Stepney has said, the Bill is a very important item of legislation in the history of the Merchant Navy. The task of the Government is to ratify the 1957 Brussels Convention as soon as possible. This was the object of my introduction of the new Clause which embodies some of the most important provisions of the Convention. Hon. Members will know that the Clause raises the monetary limits for personal and property claims and is generally agreed to by the unions concerned. I would like to thank them, and particularly the National Union of Seamen, the Merchant Navy Officers' Association and the Transport and General Workers' Union, for the assistance they


have given during consultations with my Department. I am glad that they are satisfied with these new limits.
I would remind hon. Members that a great deal remains to be done in another place, where we have to complete our implementation of the whole Convention.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

Orders of the Day — METROPOLITAN POLICE ACT, 1839 (AMENDMENT) BILL

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

12.37 p.m.

Mr. Geoffrey Stevens: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
I would thank the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the help and advice which he gave to the House during the Second Reading debate and in Committee.
The previous Bill, to which we have just given a Third Reading, affected arrangements which were made nearly a hundred years ago. This Bill concerns things which were fixed 120 years ago. It is time a change were made. The Bill touches a specific matter, threatening and insulting behaviour, concerning which a penalty of 40s. was fixed for the Metropolitan Area 120 years ago, a sum which seems inadequate when judged by modern standards.
I was glad to have the assurance of the Joint Under-Secretary of State on Second Reading that, possibly as a result of the introduction of the Bill, the whole question of penalties for offences specified in Section LIV of the 1839 Act was being reconsidered by the Home Office. Those offences range widely, from persons accused of the offence that they did
expose for Show or Sale (except in a Market lawfully appointed for that Purpose,) or feed or fodder any Horse or other Animal,
down to every person
who shall fly any Kite or play al any Game to Annoyance of the Inhabitants or Passengers.
Those are occupations with which hon. Members of the House are not now familiar, but which were evidently regarded as dangerous then.
The Bill is small, but it has wide implications. It has been welcomed from both sides of the House and I hope that the House will this afternoon give it a unanimous Third Reading.

12.39 p.m.

Mr. James Dance: I beg to second the Motion.
I believe that in doing so I have the support of the vast majority of people in the country, who are extremely perturbed at the goings on of Teddy boy gangs. These gangs disturb the peace of the country, not only by their bad crimes but by their insulting behaviour. I hope that this Bill will curb their activities.
When we talk about punishment, what do we really mean? We do not punish people just for the sake of it. We punish for one reason, and that reason is to produce a deterrent. If a punishment does deter people from committing crimes or from recommitting crimes—and there are many who are recommitting crimes—it is a step in the right direction. For a punishment to be a deterrent it must be felt.
At the present, we see increased wage claims being made throughout the country to bring people's pay up to the value of the £ at present. In exactly the same way fines, if they are to be a deterrent, should be increased. For example, if when these penalties were first brought in it was intended that they should take two or three weeks' wages to pay them, it makes a mockery of the whole system if the amounts of the fines can be earned in a few hours. I think it is perfectly right that these fines should be increased.
However, there is one question which worries me, and it is this. How can we be certain that the youths I am referring to who commit these crimes really pay the fines themselves? I raised this subject in this House quite recently. I believe it is true that in many cases the parents pay these fines. I believe it is also true that in many cases the parents are themselves to blame. The fact remains, however, that the perpetrators of the crimes themselves should be made to pay and to suffer the punishment.
I wonder whether, when this Bill goes to another place, that question will be considered. I wonder whether it would be possible to have the amount of the


fines stopped from the pay packets of the offenders. I hope some method could be found to ensure that these fines are paid by the criminals themselves. Would it be possible to impound the Teddy boys' suits until they do pay the fines?—because they are pretty revolting at the present moment. Further to that, I wonder if it would be possible to cut off the Teddy boys' curls and to continue cutting them off until the Teddy boys pay their fines.
I believe it was Gilbert in the "Mikardo" who said
Make the punishment fit the crime.
I believe that is just what we have to do at the present moment. I am quite certain that much of the punishment at present is far too lenient. I suggest to magistrates that if we were to have a little less binding over and a little more bending over we might get a certain amount of improvement in their behaviour and a more effective deterrent for these young, stupid men.
I support the Bill because I think it goes a certain way to strengthen the deterrent against crime. I do not think it goes far enough, and I hope that when it goes to another place these few points I have put forward will be seriously considered.

12.44 p.m.

Mr. Stephen McAdden: I intervene for only a moment to speak in support of this Bill. I agree with all that has been said about the desirability of bringing up to date the punishments for the offences which are so rife today, and I entirely agree with my hon. Friends in what they have said about the desirability of bringing the fines more in line with the modern earning capacity of some of those who are guilty of this insulting and gross behaviour.
I am, however, forced, in the interests of my constituency, to utter just one word of warning. As I understand it, this Bill applies only to the Metropolitan Police area. Apparently, those who commit these acts of insulting behaviour in the Metropolitan Police area will, when the Bill becomes law, be subjected to heavier fines for such behaviour than they would if they were to commit that same insulting behaviour outside the Metropolitan Police District.

Mr. Stevens: Outside the Metropolitan Police area the maximum fines are fixed by the local authorities, and local authorities outside the Metropolitan Police area have authority to inflict penalties up to £100. If they have not done so, I think it is largely due to the fact that in London, the centre of the United Kingdom, the maximum has been 40s., and for that reason in the provinces the fines have tended to be rather on the low side. It is my hope, of course, that when the provinces see what London is now doing, as I hope it will do today, they may be encouraged to increase the penalties accordingly.

Mr. McAdden: I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. I think that is something which ought to be brought out in consideration of this Bill. I imagine that a number of the local authorities are not aware of this power they have. Alternatively, they have not chosen to act upon it. It gives me some consolation to know that they can.
I must confess that when I first heard that the penalties for this insulting behaviour were to be increased in London I had some fear, in view of the fact that I represent a constituency quite close to London, that there might be some migration of the lads who are indulging in this insulting behaviour from London to my constituency in the hope that they might get away with that behaviour there on the cheap. I am glad to hear that that is not the case.
I hope that the Council of the County Borough of Southend, if it is the body responsible for the administration of fines for offences of this character, will take heart from the fact that the House of Commons has decided, as I hope it is about to do, that these penalties shall be increased in the Metropolitan Police area, and I hope it will be encouraged to take quite drastic action to increase the fines for similar offences there, should they ever occur there, although, of course, that is unlikely in normal circumstances, for riotous and insulting behaviour is unlikely at Southend, which is well known to be one of the leading and best conducted seaside resorts of this country.
However, were this Measure to result in driving the perpetrators of these offences from London to Southend in the hope of committing their offences more


cheapily it might have serious consequences. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reminding us that local authorities outside London have power to forestall them. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the Bill, and I am sure the people of Southend will be, also.
I hope that my hon. and learned Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State, who, I hope, will intervene in the debate, will make it clear that the attention of local authorities outside London will be drawn to the power which they possess with a view to securing that there shall be some uniformity in practice throughout the whole of the country in this matter.

12.47 p.m.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. David Renton): If I understood my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, East (Mr. McAdden) rightly, he was suggesting that a Government circular might be sent to local authorities, other than those in the Metropolitan Police area, suggesting that they should bring their byelaws into line with the provisions of the Bill. I speak without having had the opportunity of considering the point, but I think it is a matter which might be attended by certain difficulties. However, I will at least consider it and will write to my hon. Friend about it.
I am sure the House and all who live in the Metropolitan area are grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Lang-stone (Mr. Stevens) for his initiative in introducing the Bill, which, although very narrow in its terms, does cover an important point. Teddy boys have been mentioned, but they are not the only people against whom the police have to proceed in the Metropolitan area for using insulting words and behaviour.
Let it not be thought that this Bill will prevent serious crime, but it will assist the

police very greatly indeed to be able to prosecute people who are a nuisance, or exhibitionists, and who sometimes move on from that condition into being criminals, in the knowledge that the courts will have power to award sufficiently large fines to affect the offenders' pockets.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove (Mr. Dance) asked whether these fines really are paid. I have not the figures with me, although I produced them for the House on another occasion recently. It is interesting to note that an extremely large percentage of all the fines awarded in this country are paid. There are very few ultimate bad debts, and the percentage of people who have to be sent to prison in default of payment of fine is in these days very small.
The question whether the offenders themselves, if they are Teddy boys, will pay the fines, or whether their parents will do so, was also raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove. It is a difficult question to answer and, candidly, in the case of very young offenders I do not think it is a terribly important one. As my hon. Friend himself rightly pointed out, the parents have some responsibility in this matter, and the good conduct of the youths must be to some extent a matter of proper control and understanding by the parents of their children. The great thing, however, is that if young people indulge in insulting words and behaviour they can now be more heavily fined, and either they or their parents, or both, will feel the consequences more severely.
I might be out of order if I attempted to answer the various other interesting points that have been raised, but we shall not forget them.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

Orders of the Day — PHYSICAL TRAINING AND RECREATION BILL

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

12.52 p.m.

Mr. Stephen McAdden: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
I am moving this Motion in the absence of my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Sir S. Summers), the promoter of the Bill.
This Bill deals with a comparatively narrow point. As will be well known, local authorities now have power to make gifts to certain organisations concerned with physical training and recreation. However, under the existing law, as I understand it, they do not have the power to make loans to these organisations.
The purpose of this excellent Bill, which was considered in Committee and amended, is to confer on local authorities the power to make loans to such voluntary organisations for various types of activities—towards the expense of providing and maintaining gymnasiums, playing fields, swimming baths and other facilities. It also includes power for a local authority to make a loan to a voluntary organisation for meeting any expenses of the organisation, being expenses towards which the local authority could make a contribution under Clause 1. In other words, whereas formerly local authorities have had the power to make gifts, and gifts only, the Bill proposes that they shall now have power, if it is thought desirable by the local authority, to make loans for similar excellent purposes.
There must be many towns and villages throughout this country where there exist hard-working, voluntary organisations which are doing a great deal of useful, desirable and necessary work. It has been a handicap in the past that although they have been capable of planning some scheme, such as those outlined in this Bill, which they are capable of themselves financing in the long run, in the short run they are unable to provide the necessary capital for launching the project. It would seem to be altogether praiseworthy that the local authorities should be able to make

loans to organisations which can be repaid from the income they will derive from such schemes in subsequent years, rather than local authorities should be confined to having the power only to make gifts.
This seems to me to be a commendable step forward and one which all sides of the House will, I hope, welcome, because all of us are familiar with the great deal of useful work done by voluntary organisations in our own constituencies and elsewhere. For instance, in my own constituency there is a crying need for an indoor swimming pool. We have now only a small one which is run by a private school in the area. Some hon. Members might wonder why we want an indoor pool in view of the great facilities for bathing which exist in Southend at least twice in every twenty-four hours—not all the time, but when the tide comes in. We have an excellent open air pool, but there is this demand in my constituency, as I do not doubt there is in the constituencies of other hon. Members, for the provision of an indoor pool. If a body of interested people could be banded together, prepared to undertake such a project, and the local authority were in a position, not to provide all the money but to make a loan to start them on the process of the provision of this facility, it would be much welcomed by my constituents.
I do not doubt that hon. Members on both sides of the House will be able to think of many desirable projects in their own constituencies which would come to fruition as a result of the passage of this Measure; not as a result of increasing the burden on the ratepayers by the council paying the whole cost, but by the council making a loan to these voluntary bodies to enable them to carry out this excellent and desirable work of improving the physical training and recreation of the people of Great Britain.
In the absence of my hon. Friend, I have every confidence in commending this Measure to the House. I hope it will find a ready acceptance from those who are interested in the important work of encouraging voluntary organisations to provide these amenities with the assistance of local authorities through loans, instead of restricting them, as hitherto to gifts from local authorities.

12.58 p.m.

Mr. David Griffiths: I wish to support this Bill. I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman the Member for Southend, East (Mr. McAdden) in his wish for an indoor swimming pool for his constituency, despite its existing amenities, but I submit that this Bill will serve an even more useful purpose for many small authorities throughout the country who have not the amenities enjoyed by Southend.
I congratulate the promoter and sponsors of the Bill, and I would like to have seen it go even further. Nevertheless, it is an advance, since until now local authorities have been prohibited from making loans or interesting themselves financially in projects which this Bill covers. So it is an important Measure and one to which, I think, we should all give our loyal support.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

Orders of the Day — SOLICITORS (SCOTLAND) BILL [Lords]

Considered in Committee.

[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

12.59 p.m.

Captain M. Hewitson: On a point of order, Sir Charles. May I draw your attention to the fact that there is not a quorum present?

The Chairman: I am sorry, but a count cannot be called before one o'clock.

Clause 1.—(QUALIFICATION FOR ADMIS SION AS SOLICITOR.)

Mr. Malcolm MacPherson: I beg to move, in page 1, line 18, at the end to insert:
Provided that in the case of any person who is an applicant for admission as a solicitor and in respect of whom the Council are not so satisfied, they shall serve upon such person, at the address shown upon his or her application for admission, notice in writing that the Council are not so satisfied, and setting forth—

(a) the specific reasons for their being not so satisfied; and
(b) that the Council have for such reasons decided to refuse him or her admission as a solicitor;

and such person shall then be entitled within twenty-eight days of the date on which such notice is served upon him or her, to appeal to

the Court against the decision of the Council, and on any such appeal the Court may confirm or overturn such decision, or may give such other direction in the matter as the Court thinks fit, including directions as to the expenses of the proceedings before the Court, and the order of the Court shall be final.
This Amendment is concerned with the possibility of appeal from a decision connected with the admission of solicitors. On reading Clause 1, it would appear to the layman that there is no appeal from the decision that is taken by the Council of the Law Society under the Clause. In fact, I am glad to find that the main point with which the Amendment sought to deal is covered by the linking of this Bill with its predecessors and by the Amendment to be moved later by the hon. Member for Edinburgh, South (Mr. M. Clark Hutchison). However, there remains one point on which I should like to argue the substance of the Amendment.
1.0 p.m.
Clause 1 sets out three conditions which have to be satisfied before admission as a solicitor in Scotland. The first is that the person concerned must have reached the age of 21; the second is that he must have satisfied certain conditions as to training and education; and the third is that he must be in the opinion of the Council of the Law Society of Scotland a fit and proper person to follow the profession of solicitor. It is with the third point that I am concerned.
The Council of the Law Society makes a decision as to whether it considers an applicant to be a fit and proper person to be recommended to the Court of Session for admission as a solicitor. One presumes that this decision is made not in the interests simply of the legal profession but in the interests of the public in general. It happens that the professional organisations, including the Law Society of Scotland, do a great deal of work in the matter of organisation in the profession which would otherwise, were it not done by these organisations, fall to be done by some public authority. In a number of the decisions which they are called upon to make one assumes that they have in mind the public interest. I think that one may assume that in connection with this decision. Theoretically, I suppose, the public should decide whom it wishes to serve it in the capacity of a member of the profession, but it is a great deal more convenient for the profession itself to do it.
When an applicant is refused a statement by the Council that he is a fit and proper person, it will normally be, one imagines, because his character is bad in some way or other. I say "normally," but I suppose that such occasions will occur only very rarely. Normally one would not expect that the decision of the Council in a matter of this sort would be disputed, but I think one must take into account the possibility of unusual circumstances.
The decision is, after all, taken by the Council simply as a body of men who hear the applicant in private and who are, besides belonging to a particular profession, human beings subject to all the gusts of opinion that may blow about at whatever time they may be considering an application. It is perfectly possible, to put it bluntly, that at a certain time there may be strong feelings—about, let us say, extreme political or other beliefs—which might sway members of the Council. It is against that kind of danger that one must be continually watchful. I do not say that it will occur very often. Indeed, I am not sure that in the case of a profession of this sort it is at all likely to occur even over a long stretch of time, but it is the kind of thing against which, it seems to me, one ought to make sure that there is some safeguard. One has known in other countries, if not in this country, cases in which great gusts of public feeling have condemned minorities out of hand, and it is perfectly possible that such a thing could happen here.
An applicant in a situation like this, is, after all, a minority, and it is in order to make sure that he has some proper defence that I have tabled my Amendment. The defence of the applicant, in so far as it relates to an appeal over the head of the Council of the Law Society is, I think, met by the Amendment which is to be moved by the hon. Member for Edinburgh, South which declares that the existing situation under the Solicitors (Scotland) Act, 1933, is unaltered.
My Amendment, however, also suggests that, besides the appeal, there ought to be a statement from the Council of the Law Society to the applicant stating plainly the reason why it has not found him to be a fit and proper person. This seems to me to be only reasonable

and fair treatment—only justice, if one wishes to use the word. The applicant ought to be told why as a result of a decision of this sort he is not being found to be a fit and proper person. There is, after all, a stigma placed upon him. Anyone who knows that he has made an application and has been turned down will certainly feel that he is in some way, with which they are not familiar, open to criticism.
I am told that there are certain practical difficulties in the way of carrying out this proposal. I am told that it is not possible to put in writing in a letter to the applicant a statement which makes clear the reason why he is turned down if the reason is concerned perhaps with his past individual record or character as shown in his public actions. He may, indeed, be a person convicted of an offence, or something of that sort. I am not sure that this is a good argument against giving such a statement.
I gather that the argument is that if such a statement were made, the Council, which is not protected in any way by privilege in these matters, would find itself perhaps open to a libel action. I am very doubtful whether that is a full justification for not giving such a statement. If the Council rests a decision of this sort on something which could be actionable for libel, it seems to me that it is resting its decision on something on which it should not rest it. It ought to rest its decision in a matter of this sort on something less questionable.
That is the substance of what I have to say. The main part of my Amendment, that concerned with appeal, is being met, but the other part, that concerned with the provision of a statement to the applicant of the reasons why he is not considered a fit and proper person, is not so far being met.

Mr. Michael Clark Hutchison: I appreciate the points made by the hon. Member for Stirling and Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Malcolm MacPherson), and I largely agree with the object of his Amendment. However, I think he is under some misapprehension as to how solicitors are admitted in Scotland.
The provisions concerning admission are contained in Sections 14 and 15 of the


Solicitors (Scotland) Act, 1933. These, as amended by the present Bill, provide that an applicant for admission may present to the court a petition praying to be admitted. If the applicant has a certificate from the Law Society, the court will admit him automatically. It has no discretion in the matter.
In a case where an individual has not such a certificate, there is nothing to prevent him from going to the court and asking for admission. It is then up to the court to examine his case and ascertain whether he is a competent and fit person, and if it decides that he is then he can be admitted. In other words, the court has complete discretion. There is, thus, this right to bypass, as it were, the Council, and I believe that that will meet the hon. Member's point.
All this was perhaps not very clear in the Bill as it was first drafted, and I am grateful to the hon. Member for drawing attention to it, but I think the point will be made quite clear in the Amendment which I shall shortly move.
The hon. Member said that the Council did not give reasons for refusing an application and mentioned that it might make itself liable to an action for damages if reasons were given in writing. That is so—in a number of cases there is a risk of an action arising and the Council does not feel it should run such risks. If a person, however, went to the Council and sought admission and was refused, he could still go to the court and at the hearing, if the Law Society still opposed the admission, it would have to give its reasons and it would then be up to the court to say yea or nay.
I believe that this explanation will meet the hon. Member's point and I think that he will regard my Amendment as covering the matters which he has raised. I hope that my account will satisfy him.

The Lord Advocate (Mr. W. R. Milligan): I intervene to welcome the Bill on behalf of the Government. It was welcomed in another place and supported by my noble Friend Lord Strathclyde and Lord Mathers also gave it his approval.
I am much obliged to the hon. Member for Stirling and Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Malcolm MacPherson) for having raised this matter of appeals and reasons. My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh,

South (Mr. M. Clark Hutchison) has sufficiently dealt with the question of appeal and I think that the hon. Member appreciates the position there, but I respectfully suggest that the Committee should not accept the principle of the hon. Member's Amendment as it affects reasons.
In a similar situation, where one has an appointment, election or admission to a professional body with which to deal, it is not the practice to give reasons. That does not mean that it is a good practice. As the Committee will remember, this whole question of tribunals—although this is not of the type with which the Franks Committee dealt—was recently explored. It may be desirable in similar circumstances that reasons should be given, but that would be a departure from the present regular practice. However, I am certain that the Law Society will carefully note what the hon. Member has said and will consider whether any possible modification should be made.
I take this opportunity to congratulate the Law Society on presenting the Bill and thanking my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, South for supporting it, and thanking the hon. Member for Stirling and Falkirk Burghs for all the interest he has taken. Perhaps in those circumstances the hon. Member will see fit to withdraw the Amendment.

Mr. Malcolm MacPherson: I think that there still remains a point outstanding, but it is a point on which there is not much difference between us and I agree that the major part of my Amendment is met by the hon. Member's Amendment. In those circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: In page 2, line 13, at end insert:
(3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall prejudice the power of the Court to admit a person as a solicitor in pursuance of the Colonial Solicitors Act, 1900, or under section fourteen or section fifteen of the Act of 1933.—[Mr. M. Clark Hutchison.]

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

1.15 p.m.

Mr. Malcolm MacPherson: The main element in this matter of admission to the legal profession is the legal training and education which the applicant must undergo. In these matters, although the Court of Session has the final decision on whether an applicant will be admitted, the Council of the Law Society is the supervisory body which will make the regulations which must be submitted to the Court of Session. It is the body which will take the first step in deciding whether a person is suitable and properly qualified to be admitted to the profession.
The concurrence of the Lord President in the regulations which are made must be sought, but there is no provision for the representation of the public interest—apart from the Lord President who is himself professionally concerned with the legal profession, if not with the solicitors' half of it.
The professions serve the public and are proud to serve the public, but there is an argument in favour of having the public represented in those parts of the professional organisation which are concerned with education, particularly formal classroom education. A profession itself is likely to see the more immediate things, the matters more concerned with day-to-day work in its own conduct of business. That has, in fact, been the history of legal education in Scotland. It has tended to be fairly narrowly professional.
On the other hand, the public may have other interests. It may want to see something a little beyond that and there may be specific questions on which the public should have the right to having its point of view considered. For instance, one matter which is very important to the public in the present situation is the levels of academic qualifications required for entrance to courses of professional study.
Several professional groups, namely, perhaps, the smaller or sub-professions, or semi-professions, seem to many people to ask for qualifications which are far too high—in terms of Higher Leaving Certificate passes in Scotland and, in England, the Ordinary and Advanced Level G.C.E. passes—before permitting candidates to embark on courses of study for their profession.
The professions, naturally, want to keep their own levels high, but the public may well think differently. The public may think that a certain level is sufficient and that there should be sufficient people left possessing high qualifications to be spread to other professions. We do not want a professional group to take more than its fair share of well-qualified youngsters leaving school. This is not a reflection on the legal profession; but it is a matter of some public concern in connection with a number of other professions at the moment.
That is an example of the kind of question connected with the training and education for the professions in which the public may have a very strong interest and in which the public point of view is quite likely to be different from the professional point of view and to be right. I do not say that that happens in the case of solicitors, but it is a general point affecting all the professions. It is desirable that there should be public representation in managing and deciding on the courses of professional training.
An analogy is that of the General Medical Council which has the oversight of training for the medical profession, but which does not consist entirely of medically trained people. It includes non-medically qualified people so that at any time there is always a small handful of laymen on the Council.
In a matter of this sort I think it is generally advisable to have on the Council lay people, representing the public interest, as well as professionally qualified people representing the professional interest, even though these latter are themselves also trying to keep in mind the public interest.
My second point deals with legal training and education. Subsection (1, a) deals with practical training, and subsection (1, b) with attendance at a course of legal education. These two matters are separated.
The requirements which the Council may prescribe; subject to the concurrence of the Lord President, are those which the applicant must meet. We have no further description of them than that they are
such requirements as the Council may … prescribe.


The public, simply with the Bill and without the regulations—which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny and are subject only to the concurrence of the Lord President after framing by the society—are asked to buy a pig in a poke. I do not particularly object to that, but the principle might be objectionable, and there is the desirability of public representation.
The intention of the Law Society, I understand, is to implement the provisions of Clause 1, through regulations, in a direction that I fully agree with. It is to carry out, in practice, the distinction made between legal training, on the one hand, and legal education and the passing of examinations on the other. This is a very good thing. It will change the present system of apprenticeship by which the law student is a part-time worker in the firm's office and a part-time student in legal classes.
It will mean that one period of his training he will be working full-time in an office and at another period attending full-time law classes. This will have the purely practical and secondary advantage—but a very useful one—that when he is a student he will be able to obtain the ordinary public grant given to students requiring such grants in order to help their education, without being told, as he is at present, "We cannot make such-and-such a grant to you because you are earning your living part-time and are not a full-time student." It will regularise his position as a student. As a part-time worker in the firm's office he is at present looked on as perhaps not worth a great deal of remuneration until he has learned much more, but as a full-time worker he will presumably be given wider responsibilities and also more remuneration. From the purely practical point of view, therefore, this division would seem to have its advantages.
Another desirable feature in the separation of education and training is that the Clause, through regulations, will enable the Law Society to insist on whatever can be done in a formal and organisational way to improve the legal education of solicitors in Scotland. It would not be unfair to say that legal education in Scotland today is, in general, bad. I do not suggest that that adjective

covers every single part of the picture, but as a general description it is unquestionably true.
The provision will enable the universities to improve their legal education quite considerably, because if they have more full-time students there will be far more incentive to turn the university law faculties from merely professional training schools into proper faculties of law, encouraging more research, by encouraging more scholarship, and, as T. B. Smith suggested in the Scotsman recently, by looking upon the legal course as something more than a mere legal training.
I do not want to pursue this point further, because I am a little afraid of going too far beyond the scope of the discussion on the Question, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill", but it seems to me that, in practice, the Scottish universities will probably be very glad of the opportunity to substitute for the present rather unsatisfactory law courses, courses which are rather more in keeping with university education in general.
I find one practical difficulty in the position. I do not believe that we are in a position to carry on four separate law courses at the four Scottish universities. We ought to close down three of the faculties and concentrate on one law faculty for Scotland. Apart from other considerations, the number of people in the legal profession in Scotland is so small that it cannot possibly staff, in the proper university sense, more than one good law faculty. With these comments I welcome the Clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 2 to 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause.—(ENROLMENT OF NOTARIES PUBLIC.)

After the commencement of this Act every person admitted as a solicitor shall have his name added to the roll or register of notaries public without further application, and no person shall have his name added to the roll or register of notaries public who is not also admitted as a solicitor.—[Mr. Malcolm MacPherson.]

Brought up and read the First Time.

Mr. Malcolm MacPherson: I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
I apologise for the drafting of the Clause. It is clumsier than I thought, because it does not make clear the point that I wanted to make clear. In part, it is redundant. That was something I could not help, unless I was going to make it a very lengthy and roundabout Clause. But even at that, apparently, it does not make the point quite clear.
The Clause seeks to provide one common roll of solicitors and notaries public. At present, there are two separate rolls. I suggest that the two rolls should continue for those who are at present members of either, but that after the coming into force of this Act the rolls should be amalgamated. When an applicant becomes a solicitor he should also automatically become a notary public without further effort on his part or arrangement of any sort. In other words, from that time on the roll of solicitors and notaries public would be one.
I understand that my Amendment has been read in such a way as to suggest that the two rolls should continue separately and under rather more difficult circumstances than at present. That is not the intention. The reason why I think that there should be only one roll is that at present there seems no advantage in keeping a separate roll of notaries public. Indeed, to the public it is a disadvantage.
At present, no one may become a notary public unless he is already a qualified solicitor, and we find, therefore, that in a number of firms one member of the firm will become a notary public. The only thing he has to do is to pay about £8 for enrolment and registration. It is handy at present for a firm to have one member undertaking the duties of notary public; but these duties are so restricted that it does not seem to be at all necessary to have a separate roll. Therefore, there seems to me to be no reason why any member of a firm in this situation should not be able to carry out these duties, and it seems sensible that all solicitors should automatically be notaries public.
1.30 p.m.
The present situation is defended, if it needs defence—it is not such a serious matter that one need talk about it in terms of attack and defence, because it is a comparatively minor change which I am suggesting, and would not revolutionise

the legal life of Scotland—on the grounds that notaries public have existed as a separate profession for some time, and that they are all, in any case, qualified solicitors, and, therefore, it does not matter. It is just that kind of thing, the persistence of an organisational arrangement, which does not seem to have any functional need in itself, which tends to make our professional life a little more complicated and make the position of members of the public, the chief persons concerned in these matters, more difficult than it ought to be.
I do not believe that if there was only one roll for solicitors and notaries public anything would be lost. I do not think the duties would be performed any less well, or that there would be any diminution at all in the service to the public. It seems to me, therefore, desirable that the two rolls should be merged, and that everyone becoming a solicitor should automatically become a notary public.

Mr. M. Clark Hutchison: I should like to say a word or two about notaries public. The office originated in Roman times, when the notarius, a slave or freedman, took down the proceedings in court in shorthand. I did not know that shorthand existed at that time, but it appears to be the case. The office has been known in Britain for many years and under the Canon law, it is interesting to note, that the evidence of a notary was worth that of two unskilled witnesses.
The office exists in every European country, whether its law is derived from the Romans or otherwise. In most countries, the status of notaries public is rather higher than we hold it in Scotland or England. They are nominated in France by the President of the Republic, and in the District of Columbia, in America, by the President of the United States, and in other States of America by the State Governor. It will be seen that in these countries they are officials held in considerable esteem. I think that we should remember this, because when documents are going back and forth between this country and foreign countries, if they have the seal of a notary here, they are likely to be accepted, whereas if simply stamped by a solicitor the foreigner might be a little suspicious.
A notary's functions in Scotland include help to people suffering from


disabilities. They can act for the blind, the disabled or people who cannot read. But their more usual job is that of noting and protesting bills of exchange and noting maritime protests. These are jobs in which the ordinary solicitor may not be particularly interested. The hon. Gentleman opposite will agree, from what I have said, that the office is an ancient one. A notary's practice is not necessarily the same as that of a solicitor, and I would ask the hon. Gentleman to bear in mind the point I made as to the status of notaries abroad and the way in which we regard them here.
I think that it would be wrong, in this Bill, to tinker with the status of notaries, and I would myself prefer to leave the situation as it is at present. If we did alter the position, there would be considerable confusion in the various rolls. To become a notary, a special fee is charged, and we should have to levy more money on solicitors. There are also administrative aspects which would have to be altered, and, it may be, altered by Statute. I would, therefore, ask the hon. Gentleman to agree that it would be better to leave the situation as it is at the moment.
However, I will give the hon. Gentleman two undertakings. First, if the hon. Member is of the opinion that in any parts of Scotland there is a shortage of notaries, I will ask the Law Society to look into this and see whether others can be appointed. Secondly, I would impress on the hon. Gentleman the point that the various Solicitors (Scotland) Acts will, we hope, soon be consolidated into one Act. Between now and then, I shall be quite happy to ask the Law Society to examine the status and office of notaries with all interested parties. If it is possible or desirable to amalgamate notaries and solicitors that could be done when the consolidation Act is brought forward. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be content with those two undertakings.

The Lord Advocate: I should point out that there is another difficulty to which I must draw the attention of the Committee. Before an Amendment of this kind could be accepted, there would have to be very full consultation with many interested parties, such as the Lord President of the Court of Session. I hope that, in the circumstances, the hon. Member

will not feel it necessary to press his Motion.

Mr. Malcolm MacPherson: I realise that a consolidation Bill is in contemplation, and I quite agree with the hon. Gentleman that this is, perhaps, not the best time to make this change. In view of what the learned Lord Advocate has said about the necessity of consolidation, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, and Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

First Schedule agreed to.

Second Schedule

Mr. M. Clark Hutchison: I beg to move, in page 13, line 39, at the end to insert:
(2) A reference in any enactment to a solicitor's being entitled to practise in the Court of Session or in any other court, or to act in any matter, by reason of his being enrolled in, or of his having subscribed, the list of solicitors practising in the Court of Session or the list of solicitors practising in any sheriffdom shall be construed as a reference to his being entitled so to practise or act by reason of his name being included in the appropriate list furnished under the foregoing subsection.
I should like to give the following explanation of this rather technical matter. Under Section 20 of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act, 1933, a list of solicitors practising in the Court of Session is kept by the principal clerk, and also a list of the solicitors practising in every Sheriff Court is kept by the sheriff's clerk. These various lists or rolls are signed by the solicitors who wish to practise. For ease of administration, this arrangement is being abolished under the present Bill, and it will be for the Law Society to furnish annually to the clerk of the Court of Session or to each sheriff's clerk a list of the solicitors who will be practising.
This is the rather complicated second point. Under certain Statutes, such as the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, and certain other rather old Acts, authority is given to solicitors enrolled on a particular sheriff clerks' rolls to carry out certain acts and serve notices. That system will be inconsistent with the practice which, we hope, will obtain after this Bill becomes law, and the purpose of the Amendment is to give solicitors


the power to carry out the various duties which I have mentioned by virtue of having their names on the Law Society's roll, which the Law Society will keep and furnish.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. M. Clark Hutchison: I beg to move, in page 14, line 1, after "thirty-nine," to insert:
after the words 'Faculty of Advocates' there shall be inserted the word 'or', the words 'or a notary public' shall be omitted, and".
I am afraid that this is another technical matter. It is very short, and I should like to explain it to the Committee. Section 39 of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act, 1933, provides that a person who is not a member of the Faculty of Advocates, a duly certified solicitor or a notary public and who acts in conveyancy matters or in court proceedings shall be guilty of an offence. The purpose of the Amendment is to delete the reference to notaries public in that Section.
It should be explained that the inclusion of a notary public within the Section is now obsolete as there are no notaries public in Scotland who are not solicitors. Under Section 2 of the Law Agents (Scotland) Act, 1896, no notaries per se could be created after 14th August, 1897. The Amendment is a purely technical matter.

Amendment agreed to.

Schedule, as amended, agreed to.

Third Schedule agreed to.

Bill reported, with Amendments; as amended, considered.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Bill be now read the Third time.—[Mr. M. Clark Hutchison.]

1.42 p.m.

Mr. Malcolm MacPherson: I do not want to make a long speech, but I wish to congratulate the hon. Member for Edinburgh, South (Mr. M. Clark

Hutchison) on having sponsored the Bill and the Law Society on having produced it. It seems to me to be a useful Bill, but I will not go into detail about it.
I should like to make a comment, however, on the way in which the Bill has gone through Parliament with very little discussion either in another place or in this House. I am sorry about that, and I wish that it had gone, under the ordinary procedure for a Scottish Bill, through the Scottish Standing Committee. The main point in the Bill is one upon which we have not touched in our discussions this morning, and I think, possibly, I might mention it on Third Reading in connection with the comment I have made.
The major point in the Bill is contained in the Clause concerned with solicitors' accounts. The Bill makes a very considerable and very desirable reform in that connection. I think it is desirable that there should be wider discussions in the House on a matter which so closely affects the public interest. For that reason, I am sorry that we have dealt with the Bill on such a narrow basis. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be a good Bill, I wish the Law Society well with it, and I congratulate the hon. Member.

Mr. M. Clark Hutchison: May I thank the hon. Member for Stirling and Falkirk Burghs (Mr. Malcolm MacPherson)? I agree with his comment; I should have liked a longer discussion, which might have been suitable for the Scottish Standing Committee. I also agree with him that the proposed rules for the keeping of accounts are good and overdue, and I hope that they will protect the public from any possibility of damage or loss. I thank him for his interest in the Bill and for the help which he has given to me.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

Orders of the Day — DRAINAGE RATES BILL

Considered in Committee.

[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

Clause 1.—(ANNUAL VALUE FOR PURPOSES OF DRAINAGE RATES.)

Amendments made: In page 1, line 16, leave out "adopted" and insert "stated".

In page 1, line 17, leave out "for the purposes of" and insert "in".

In page 2, line 7, at end insert:
as respects the land and any amount overpaid shall be repaid or allowed and any amount underpaid may be recovered as if it were arrears of the rate".

In page 2, line 7, at end insert:
(3) Where at the date the rate Is made the annual value of the land has never been determined for the purposes of Schedule A but the land includes the whole or part of any land whose annual value has then been so determined or consists of or includes the whole or part of any such lands, then, for the purposes of subsection (2) of this section, the annual value mentioned in paragraph (b) thereof shall be taken to be the aggregate of—

(a) the annual value or values last so determined before the said date (apportioned in the case of any land only partly included in the first-mentioned land); and
(b) so much (if any) of the annual value mentioned in paragraph (a) of that subsection as is proportionate to any part of the first-mentioned land which neither is nor forms part of land whose annual value has then been determined as aforesaid.

In page 2, line 15, leave out from "when" to "and" in line 16 and insert:
an assessment for that year in respect of the land has been signed and allowed under section thirty-five of the Income Tax Act, 1952, or under that section as applied by the Fifth Schedule to that Act".

In page 2, line 18, leave out "an appeal having been brought" and insert:
a notice of appeal having been given".—[Miss Pike.]

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

1.45 p.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. J. B. Godber): I do not wish to hold up the passage of the Bill, but I should like to take this opportunity of

congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Melton (Miss Pike) on having brought the Bill forward and to make it clear that the Government support the Bill. We believe that it will be helpful and will clear up one or two doubtful points.
It is clear that the drainage board must levy a rate on whichever of the two values set out in Clause 1 (2) is the lesser. This will almost invariably be the value last determined. In most cases there will be no doubt what this value is, but it may be that a landowner has bought some adjacent parcels of land and all these parcels have been combined in one assessment. In that case, the value as last determined will be the combined value of the land which was previously assessed separately.
Again, it may be that on one of these parcels of land there was no Schedule A assessment. In that case, the procedure would be as follows. First, we take the annual values as last determined of any lands on which there was a last determination and add them together. Then one would find the proportion which the land not previously assessed for Schedule A purposes bears to the land included in the new assessment, and it is a similar proportion of the new assessment. The combination of those sums will then become the annual value as last determined for the purposes of Clause 1 (2, b).
The Bill, as drafted, operates on each rate separately. This must be so, as each rate is a separate thing. Nevertheless, if there is a dispute between the taxpayer and the Revenue about a property, and that dispute lasts for more than one year, the amendment will operate in respect of each of the rates levied in the year of dispute. I know that this sounds complicated, but if, for instance, it takes three years for an appeal to be settled, the rates levied in respect of the property in dispute for all three separate years will fall to be amended in the light of the final decision.
I have thought fit to make that clear, in case there was any doubt in the minds of those concerned. Having said it, I would merely repeat that I am very glad that my hon. Friend has brought forward the Bill which will, I think, meet a general need to clear up an undoubted


difficulty that has here arisen for drainage boards.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill reported, with Amendments.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

1.52 p.m.

Mr. Arthur Moyle: We should not part with this Bill without thanking the hon. Lady the Member for Melton (Miss Pike) for having sponsored it. As Vice-President of the Internal Drainage Authorities' Association, I can tell her that if this Measure gets on to the Statute Book, as I hope it will, it will be very much appreciated by those authorities, and will clear up one or two vague points relating to the assessment and collection of the rates concerned. I am very grateful to have this opportunity to express our appreciation to the hon. Lady.

Miss Mervyn Pike: I should like to thank all those who have made the Bill possible. As hon. Members know, I should have liked to have brought in a Bill with much greater ramifications in the realms of land drainage, but the trouble that there has been in getting agreement on this little Measure has taught me that problems of land drainage are very difficult. I should have liked to have helped my constituents who suffer the terrible hardship of flooding. However, I hope that the Bill will not only help drainage boards to do their work more effectively but will serve to draw attention to the need for bigger reforms.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

Orders of the Day — BETTING BILL

Order for Second Reading read.

1.54 p.m.

Mr. George Wigg: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
This Bill has been described by its opponents as being the thin end of the wedge. It is nothing of the kind. It is a simple Measure, designed to implement some of the recommendations of the Royal Commission, and its origin does not lie in any conspiracy against the bookmaking profession but in a debate in this House on 9th March, 1956. On that day, unfortunately, having spoken, I had to leave before the Minister replied, but in my speech I said that I would believe that any Government, be it Conservative or Labour, would implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission only when I saw it. I went further and said that I did not believe that any Government would have the guts to tackle this very difficult problem.
After I had left the House, the Minister, with the authority of the Home Secretary, accepted the recommendations of the Royal Commission and indicated that the Government intended to introduce comprehensive legislation. Indeed, he was kind enough to refer to me in his remarks in order to deny my somewhat pessimistic view. That was two years ago; we still have not had that legislation, and I believe that two years from now, whatever may be the Administration, we still shall not have had a comprehensive Measure.
In the course of my speech in 1956, I said that I sailed under the flag of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede). Like him, I am a reformer. When dealing with problems of this kind, even when great social evils are involved, I do not believe that one should try to box the compass in a short space of time. It is our national tradition when a wrong has been discovered and a remedy is indicated to go into it very gradually and then, step by step, to seek a solution in accordance with the mood and needs of the times.
There is no doubt whatever that the betting laws relating to horse racing are


every day flouted from John o'Groats to Land's End. When that happens, it not only brings the betting law into disrepute, but the corruption and the complicity that that breeds spreads throughout the whole of the community. I am sure that my right hon. Friend was influenced, when he formed his opinion on these matters, by the fact that wherever one finds major corruption amongst the police it stems, in the first instance, from the abuse of the betting law.
This is not to say that every policeman or bookmaker is seeking the one to corrupt the other. I do not believe that. But no hon. Member in any part of the House, whatever may be his views about this Bill can deny that in his constituency the betting laws every day—even as I speak—are flouted. That is not only wrong in law but it reveals a great social evil that should be put right. A problem of such magnitude, however, cannot be tackled by a private Member. It is a job for the Executive. That is one of the reasons for my belief that the present Administration have failed in their duty in not bringing forward the promised comprehensive legislation.
Having said that, I go back to my speech of March, 1956, and say that there are some things that a private Member can do and ought to try to do. Racing, and the betting connected with it, is an industry that brings pleasure to thousands. Indeed, I think that during the war it was actively tied to the maintenance of morale. Many a man will work a little harder because he is waiting for the result of the 4.30, or will work harder during the week with the prospect of a day's racing at the end of it. If he has enough money, he has access to as many accounts as he wants with as many starting price bookmakers as he wants.
I am not, however, seeking to indulge in wholesale reform of the law relating to bookmakers. By this Bill, I have sought to extend very modestly the powers of the Racecourse Betting Control Board. That Board operates in the interest of the public and of good racing. Bats are placed with the Tote, and from deductions from the bets which are made considerable sums of money are syphoned back into racing in a variety of ways. It is non-profit making. The bigger its turnover the more money it makes, the

more efficiently it is run, and the more money there will be for racing.
Whatever may be Members' views about my Bill or about betting on moral grounds, there is no doubt that a crisis has come to English racing. There was a time when the English thoroughbred was the best in the world. It established its pre-eminence by the only test that matters—the test of the race course. When challengers came across from France and tried to win the Derby they were not very successful. Now they come here to all our more valuable races and it is quite an event for English horses to do well. Our best stallions and some of our best mares are being exported. I hope my hon. Friends will not regard this as a tip, but there is more than a chance that the first, second and third places in the Derby and, indeed, in the Oaks will be filled by horses from across the Channel. That is not good either for the bloodstock industry or for national prestige.
The reason for this—and I am not throwing any bricks—is that the most powerful single interest in racing is not the Jockey Club but the bookmaking profession. That is the most powerful and, indeed, the most woeful influence. I should like to see racing, as an industry and as a pastime, so organise itself that the arrangements between the Jockey Club and the bookmaker, or the bookmaker and the backer, are established on a basis which takes into account all the interests involved. That is the ideal way. But there is no sign of the bookmaking profession or of racing as a whole putting its house in order.
I am not unmindful of an announcement in the Press today that the stewards of the Jockey Club have said that the starting price bookmakers are at last considering a scheme whereby some money may be given to racing. About time, too. It may be that this little Bill, which created quite a disturbance in the bookmaking profession, causing millions of slanderous leaflets to be printed and distributed up and down the country, has begun to work already and has hastened the announcement of this reform. But it does not go far enough.
Let me repeat, in the hope that my words may reach some quarters which seem to be oblivious to rational argument,


that I am not seeking wholesale reform. I am seeking a modest first step in the right direction of making the Racecourse Betting Control Board a more economic and efficient instrument. By this method, I hope it will be able to reduce its overheads and make a greater contribution to racing.
What does this Bill set out to do in detail? First, it implements two of the recommendations of the Royal Commission. It empowers the Board to accept bets on credit and, by cash, through the post. That is not a revolutionary proposal, and I emphasise that there is nothing in this which will legalise the setting up of betting shops. It will not be possible under this Bill for any person to resort to any premises for the purpose of making a bet. The bet must be made by post, and it can be made on credit, or by cash, and to that extent it puts the Racecourse Betting Control Board on all fours with the starting price bookmakers. There may be some hon. Gentlemen who are worried——

Mr. Dudley Williams: Will the hon. Gentleman make it clear that not only may the bets be made by post but—I think it is right—that they can also be made by telephone?

Mr. Wigg: That, I would think, is a detail. If they can be communicated by the written word I would have thought it would follow that they could be communicated by the spoken word. The point I am dealing with is the thought which may exist in some Members' minds that this may be the thin end of the wedge towards the setting up of betting shops. I should have thought that there were two words already in the Bill which make it just possible for confusion to arise. If the Bill reaches the Committee stage I shall be prepared to move to delete the words "for cash" in Clause 1 (3). That would remove all possible doubt on this point and would establish that bets will be on credit only and that it will only be possible to carry out transactions by post. If any hon. Member is worried about this, as I say, I shall be prepared to consider an Amendment; but I would have thought that it is a matter not of principle but of convenience. I should have thought that if it is done by post there would be no objection to it being done by telephone.
If bets are going to be made on credit, and if they are going to be made in any way in which there is a time lag between the decision to make a bet and the arrival of the bet at the Racecourse Betting Control Board, it follows that the successful punter will want his or her money. It may well be that, through delays in the post, a bet may arrive so late as not to be included in the pool. Therefore, under Clause 1 (2, b) power is given to the Board to act as a bookmaker and to pay the winning bet even though it is not included in the pool. That will guard against a breakdown in communications or a delay in the post.
Another important thing that Clause 1 does is to enable the Board to instal electronic computing machinery at a central place—let us say in London—to which place the bets would be fed back by telephone, the computing machine doing the donkey work. The Tote would have this machine permanently installed in a central place, and it would only be necessary to transport from racecourse to racecourse the actual selling machinery. I should think no hon. Member could object to that. It would lessen the administrative costs and, therefore, would help the Racecourse Betting Control Board to do its job more cheaply.
It seems to me that the controversial part of the Bill is in Clause 2. It implements a recommendation of the Royal Commission in that it prohibits any person other than the Board from carrying on pari-mutuel or pool betting on horse races or from accepting any bet save with the Board's permission. In the literature which has been put out by the less informed section of the bookmaking profession, this is regarded as limiting the power of the bookmaker and as the thin end of the wedge towards a Tote monopoly. My answer is that that is arrant nonsense. The Tote cannot lay starting price bets. Why, then, should a bookmaker be able to lay Tote prices and not make any contribution to the means whereby those prices are assessed? The Tote board, be it noted, is not out to make a profit; it is concerned with siphoning money back into racing. Therefore, to give the Tote board the right to have a monopoly only so far as the running of totes and pools is concerned seems to me eminently reasonable.
If it be that some people, who are not very financially ambitious and who are not likely to affect the Tote turnover may want to run a totalisator. They may do so, provided that they get the Tote board's permission. I do not believe that permission would be unreasonably withheld. The board would, of course, want to be satisfied that a contribution or a percentage from the private tote found its way back into the Tote fund, as by so doing the private tote would then be making a contribution to racing.

Mr. Stephen McAdden: The hon. Gentleman says that some other unambitious or, indeed, ambitious body which wanted to run a tote would apply to the Racecourse Betting Control Board, as I understand it, and could get a licence. Would such people be subject to the 30 per cent. pools betting duty, whereas the Tote is not?

Mr. Wigg: The Bill is not an annex to the Finance Act. It is not the servant of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If the hon. Gentleman is upset by the idea that bookmakers who want to run pools should be subject to the law of the land, I am not shocked by it. That is the fact. If they run pools under this arrangement, they would need a licence from the Racecourse Betting Control Board, and, of course, they would be subject to the ordinary provisions of the Finance Act, as is any other citizen.

Mr. McAdden: Not the Tote.

Mr. Wigg: The Racecourse Betting Control Board is a public body, nonprofit making, set up to serve the interests of racing and not the private interests of the bookmaker. The House, in its wisdom, has decided that it should not pay. In any case, if the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that this is a grievous fault, I hope he will look with some care—I am sure that he has—at the vast sums which are made by starting price bookmakers, every penny of which goes into their pockets. There is no check of any kind on that. The fact that a person who wants to run a pool or a tote should have to obtain permission from the Racecourse Betting Control Board and then have to pay tax to the Treasury seems to me to be in no sense a hardship. With great respect to the hon. Member for Southend, East (Mr. McAdden), I do

not think that he puts it forward as a serious point which he really wants me to answer. He knows the answer perfectly well.
The next point which may be regarded as controversial, though I should not regard it so, is that my Bill gives the Racecourse Batting Control Board the copyright in its prices. I do not want to send anybody to prison or see anybody fined. I should have thought that one of the simplest ways of clearing up this situation was to vest the copyright, be it in starting prices or Tote prices, in those who create them. The question of copyright in the starting price is a matter for the bookmaking profession. That is its business. The Tote price will cost a great deal of money to establish. The price quoted is, therefore, the property of the Racecourse Betting Control Board. If the Board limits the use of that price to those to whom it has given permission, that again would seem to me to be absolutely straightforward. I should have thought that it would have appealed to hon. Gentlemen opposite with overwhelming force, because it is a protection for the rights of property.
To my hon. Friends I should have thought the Bill would appeal, for quite different reasons. Here is a public board, with a non-profit making motive, seeking to administer funds obtained from the public in the public good. At one time, such sentiments were tied up with the socialist faith of my hon. and right hon. Friends. I should have thought that this would be regarded as a practical application of it.
However, when people have to meet the kind of propaganda to which I have referred, they are led into difficulties. When knowledge of the Bill is confined to what can be gained from literature of the kind circulated by the bookmakers, obviously people's judgment is affected. We saw an example of that today, when an attempt was made to count the House out earlier by hon. Gentlemen who, I have no doubt, were not seeking to stop the Drainage Bill. They wanted to stop the Betting Bill. I would say to them and to the interests for whom they speak that if they wanted to count the House out and obstruct my Bill, they ought to have taken the trouble to understand the Standing Orders of the House. If, in future, they ever want to do it—perhaps,


I should hope, in a better cause than the one they chose today—and they come to me, I will give them some assistance. Perhaps we shall be a little more successful on such an occasion than they were today.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): I think I should make it clear to the House that I made a mistake. A count was called at one minute to one o'clock. After a lapse of two minutes, I could have counted the House, which would have brought it after one o'clock. I think that it was my mistake in not allowing it. I apologise.

Mr. Wigg: I had perceived that, too, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I was fully aware that it was your mistake in acting in contravention of Standing Order No. 27, the operative factor being not whether the count is called two minutes before one o'clock but whether the count is actually taken after one o'clock.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: There is nothing in the Standing Order about two minutes.

Mr. Wigg: No, Sir, but it is a question of before or after, and if I had been in the hon. Gentleman's place I should have called your attention to the fact that you were in error. That is my charge against those hon. Members concerned, that they came here, first of all, not having read my Bill, and secondly, that they had not read the Standing Orders. Therefore, I should think that they would probably serve their interest much better——

Mr. David Griffiths: Who is my hon. Friend referring to as "them"? If there are any "thems", I should like to know who they are.

Mr. Wigg: I would reply by using the old saying, "If the cap fits, wear it." If my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley (Mr. D. Griffiths) had wanted to call attention to the point at the time, perhaps he could have borrowed the hat and explained that very truth. My allusion is particularly apt.
I want, if I may, to deal now with Clause 3, which might be overlooked. Clause 3 gives certain additional powers to the Board. In the past, the Board has been faced with the difficulty of being unable to carry through schemes of which it wholeheartedly approved but which

the terms of the present law prevented it from handling. For example, the Board has been asked to provide finance for the purpose of effecting a scheme for the centralisation of racing. It has been asked to make advances to racecourses to enable them to rebuild their stands. It has been asked to provide financial help for the Equine Research Station of the Animal Health Trust, and it has been asked to assume responsibility for the finance and operation of the National Stud.
I will not comment on whether those proposals are worthwhile or not. All I say is that, under the law as it at present stands, the Racecourse Betting Control Board would be unable to consider any schemes of that kind. My Bill seeks to widen the powers of the Board, through Section 3, so that it may give practical thought to schemes which otherwise would be debarred to it.
I hope that the Bill will receive a Second Reading on its merits. Although it is late in the Session, I wonder whether the Government may find some means whereby it could be given facilities to find its way to the Statute Book. I deny absolutely the suggestion that it is the thin end of the wedge or that the Bill goes one single step further than I have indicated. It is a simple, limited step in the direction in which one hopes that, one day, some Government will go in order to rationalise the betting laws of this country.
I say now, as I said two years ago, that I am by all my instincts a reformer. I see life in terms of jobs to be done. Betting is a social problem that has got out of hand. As I have already said, we have only to consider the repeated cases of corruption among the police. This is caused not because they are bad men; it is because they are faced with temptations which they ought not to be faced with, and because they come in contact with them day after day they eventually end up in wrongdoing.
The Bill takes only the first step in the direction of getting this evil put right. I believe it would be for the good of the Racecourse Betting Control Board. I believe that it would benefit the bookmaking profession, much as some of them are against it. I also believe that it would be for the good of this House, for it would add to its reputation by


facing one of the problems of our times. It seeks in a limited way to put right something that has been crying out for a long time to be done.

2.18 p.m.

Mr. J. J. Astor: I rise to support this limited and modest Bill. As this is a Second Reading debate, I hope that I will remain in order if I ask the House to consider the Bill against the general background of the betting laws. I hope that those who are against the Bill will be able to reconcile their interests, whatever they may be, with this modest Bill. The debates on betting assume the same sort of pattern year after year, and I will try to be brief.
The first point that I want to make is that the present laws are obviously not only unfair, but unenforceable. In my opinion, they are ridiculous and make ridiculous a Government that allows them to continue. I think that the shame for these present laws lies on the shoulders of all of us in this Chamber, because we are tolerating something which is nonsense. I accept the fact that the present laws are unfair and unenforceable. This Bill seeks to extend the scope of the Tote, which does have a method of helping racing.
I have to declare an interest in racing. When hon. Members declare an interest I always imagine that they are declaring something profitable. I can only say that I am declaring an interest, but a loss, in racing. The plutocratic approach attributed to those connected with racing suggests that the interests are profitable, but I can honestly say that that is not strictly true in most cases.
If help is to be given to racing there must be some evidence that it is necessary from the public point of view as well as from the point of view of those who promote an entertainment that according to the Royal Commission gives entertainment to up to 4 million people a day, and on big race days up to 20 million people. If the people who provide this entertainment are losing millions of pounds each year, something should be done about it, if possible.
I do not want to bore the House with figures, but I have made a comparison with British racing and French racing, which is so simple I feel that anyone can understand it. For better or worse, in France there is a Tote monopoly. I do

not think that this is a good idea and it certainly would not suit England.
In France, the production of thoroughbred racehorses was one-third of ours before the war. It is now one-half. Their production is increasing. The measure of France's success in our major race, the Derby, for the twelve years before the war was one winner. For the twelve years after the war it is five. Therefore, they are five times as successful as before the war in our major race.
The French entries in the Derby, before the war, amounted to 15 per cent. Just after the war it was 25 per cent. and now it is 35 per cent. I give these figures to show that our greatest rival is increasing production and increasing the excellence of its whole racing industry. The figure of our production of horses is now static. It is the same as before the war. It increased slightly after the war, but it is now roughly the same.
Our success in our own big races is lamentable. We have managed to win only six of the Derbys which have been run in the twelve years after the war. One winner was really American bred and five winners were French.
On the other hand, our exports have doubled in volume. That does not matter but what does matter is the quality which we are now having to export. Any hon. Member who has had anything to do with breeding must accept the fact that if one exports the very best in one's garden or farmyard, or anything like that, inevitably one's own stock must decline. Hitherto, we have always exported the second best. May I give this simile? We are exporting plant. Suppose we had to export our dockyards. How would we then be able to export ships? It is as if we are exporting factories instead of the plant, or the goose instead of the golden egg.
This is the condition of racing at present. I do not think that any hon. Member who knows anything about racing will deny this. I have said it myself in the racing Press and it has never been seriously contended. There is need for help in this industry. Regarding exports, someone has published in the Press that we import £6 million worth of bloodstock and export only £5 million worth. What this person does not realise is the way that the Government work. The Government


work in very peculiar ways, but a no more peculiar way than in assessing the export and importation of bloodstock. If one sends a mare to France and while, in France, it has a foal, it then comes back to this country weeks later as an import. The figures that the Government are able to give make no sense at all. They classify horses that come into this country to be eaten and those that come in to be ridden on the same lines.

Mr. John M. Temple: Can the hon. Member tell us what is the net export of bloodstock?

Mr. Astor: All exported horses have at some stage to go through an agency. If one does a deal with a foreigner the horse has to be insured, transported and sold. The agencies agree, largely speaking, that the figure is probably between £1½ million to £2 million a year.

Mr. D. Griffiths: I wonder whether the hon. Member could give us the ratio between bloodstock and all horses?

Mr. Astor: I cannot give the ratio in numbers, but the cash value of the horses exported that are not thoroughbred is very small. One has only to export one throughbred horse worth £25,000 or so, which does happen each year, to offset hundreds of the other sorts of horses exported which average about £60, £70, £80, £90 or £100 each. If one exports a cob or carthorse it may be worth £200, but it does not compare in cash value to bloodstock. I do not think that anyone can give the exact figures.
I suggest, and everyone agrees, that there should be some association with the volume of money gambled and those people who promote the entertainment. There is unreality in many people's minds when they talk about gambling legislation. The first kind of unreality lies in the mind of the Government. All our discussion will amount to nothing unless the Government mean to do what they have said they would do. I must call attention to the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes), when he was speaking for the Government, more than two years ago. He said:
I wish to make it quite clear that it is the Government's intention to deal with this matter as soon as opportunity presents itself by introducing a Bill to implement the main lines of

the Royal Commission's recommendations … It is being prepared for introduction at the earliest practicable opportunity."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th March, 1956: Vol. 549, c. 2555.]

Mr. McAdden: Will my hon. Friend read the other extract from the same speech, where my hon. Friend said that we had reached the end of Private Members' legislation on the subject.

Mr. Astor: My hon. Friend has been able to catch Mr. Speaker's eye more than once today already, and I have no doubt that he will have an opportunity to do so again later, when he can raise that point. I have not the reference at my fingertips at the moment to do what he has asked.
The Government have virtually promised to do something about betting. I am not convinced that an alternative Government could do anything at all, although hon. Members opposite may say they would. There is such a thing as passing laws for the sake of good government. No one could conceivably support the laws as they are. It is alleged that if nothing is done about the betting laws it is because the Government do not think there are votes to be won, but I submit that that is not true. A lot of legislation passes through this House regardless of whether there are no votes to be won or lost. It is just good government that has prompted it. The only people who would be conscious of this sort of Bill are those who take part in betting and who all know that the laws ought to be remedied, and a very small minority of people who think that betting is morally wrong. I do not suggest that they reflect the great proportion of the people.
I only hope that the Government will implement their promise. If they do not, the kindest thing that we might say is that the Government are feeble. The unkindest thing is that they are somewhat misleading. Having said what they have said, it might be construed as being misleading if nothing happens. They have plenty of time to mend their ways, and I only hope that they do.
The second stratum of unreality is that as soon as one talks about betting people say, "You want a Tote monopoly". I believe that that is the view of hon. Members who are opposing the Bill. There is no question of wanting a Tote monopoly in this country. It has been proved that whatever practical advantages there may


be in such an idea there is no advantage to the public.
The third unreality is that it has been reported in the Press that the racing authorities would only support a Bill into which were written some guarantee that a proportion of off-course money would go back to racing. I wish I thought that were possible, but I cannot see that the idea is realistic. I do not think that that will ever come.
What, then, is the objective? The first objective should be to legalise betting as such. The second should be to help those bookmakers who are trying to help themselves, and help the racing industry. Very rough things are said about bookmakers. One cannot judge any profession by the least worthy members of it. In this honourable House some hon. Members might be considered as more honourable than other hon. Members. It is unfair to judge the bookmaking profession by some of its worst elements.
We are informed that those who represent bookmakers are trying to get the bookmakers a legal status. This would be admirable. It is intolerable for people to be asked to contribute something to an industry or an entertainment when their own profession is not legal. One can agree with the efforts of bookmakers to put their house in order. This fits in with the general aim of the Bill.
The best argument against the Bill is that it is piecemeal legislation. I accept that argument, but can anyone speak against piecemeal legislation? Would hon. Members have voted against National Assistance because there was not at that time a comprehensive National Health Insurance scheme? I think that we would be glad to get an element of public assistance even if we could not cover the whole field. To attack the Bill as piecemeal legislation means that a lot of other Bills which go through the House must be attacked for the same reason. I accept that it is piecemeal legislation.
There are three major points for the Bill. The first concerns copyright, and has been explained to the House already. It is difficult to argue against it. The second main point is that it would permit the tote to accept bets by post. I understand that bookmakers are allowed to accept bets by post in Scotland but not

in England. There is postal order betting with bookmakers in England through Scottish offices, but not English ones. I agree that the Bill would make betting by post legal in England as well for the Tote. If the Bill were passed, it would strengthen the case for bookmakers to have postal bets made legal for themselves. It is in a way the thin end of the wedge to help bookmakers.
Whether the Bill passes or not, I hope that from the discussion two things will emerge. I hope we can make it clear to the Government that they are in honour bound to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming, and that they are honour bound to find the time. The second is that here is an opportunity for all interested to put forward constructive ideas to help the Turf in general.

2.40 p.m.

Mr. John M. Temple: Mr. Speaker, I am exceedingly glad to have caught your eye on this important occasion. I will concentrate at the outset on the remarks of the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). I was very interested in, and I cannot say I disagreed with, his preamble in which he talked about comprehensive legislation. I was interested in the latter part of his speech, when he referred to the attempted counting out of the House. In between those points, however, I could not see that he gave us any explanation of the merits or otherwise of this Bill. Indeed, he did not really explain this Bill quite as thoroughly as I personally should have liked.
He described it in general terms as a simple little Measure. I say this Bill may be a simple Measure, but in my opinion it may have quite far-reaching effects. Anything I say now I should not like to prejudice in any way my approach to a comprehensive Measure, because my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. J. J. Astor) said that this was in the nature of piecemeal legislation. I agree with him there.
I refer to the Report of the Royal Commission on Betting and Lotteries and Gaming of 1951, Chapter 6, paragraph 266, which says:
We have concluded that illegal betting off the course cannot me prevented, either by increasing penalties or by a limited extension of the permitted forms of betting, for example,


by making cash betting by post legal. We see no object in an amendment of the law which would not enable the extent of illegal betting to be greatly reduced.
I shall seek to show that this Bill will not decrease the volume of illegal betting.
I come to my main arguments against the Bill. My main arguments I divide into four groups. I regard it as paving legislation for a totalisator monopoly; secondly, I maintain that the Bill unfairly discriminates against bookmakers; thirdly, that it may be undesirable if the volume of betting is to be substantially increased in this country; and fourthly that it extends unreasonably the powers of the Racecourse Betting Control Board.
To deal with my first point, the fact that it is paving legislation for a totalisator monopoly. Here I would refer to the remarks of Lord Astor who, speaking in another place comparatively recently, said in general terms that he advocated a totalisator monopoly——

Mr. Wigg: On a point of order. Is it in order to quote a speech made in another place?

Mr. Dudley Williams: This is a paraphrase.

Mr. Temple: I was referring to the speech in general terms.

Mr. Wigg: It is a speech made in another place in this Session.

Mr. Speaker: I did not understand the hon. Gentleman to do that. It is in order to quote Ministerial speeches in another place about policy, but not to refer to speeches by other noble Lords made in the same Session.

Mr. Temple: If that is out of order, Mr. Speaker——

Mr. Dudley Williams: Paraphrase.

Mr. Temple: —I accept your Ruling, but I was referring in general terms to what was said.

Mr. Astor: If the hon. Member is going to quote he must quote—or refer—correctly. He will see, if he looks again, that what was indicated was that a Tote monopoly is not practicable in this country.

Mr. Temple: I could not entirely agree with my hon. Friend about that matter.
What I am saying is that I am against a totalisator monopoly. Because who is to benefit by this monopoly? The racehorse owners, we are told, in order to improve the bloodstock of our country. My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton, when I asked him a question about the net export of racehorses, said the figure was approximately £1½ million. I do not consider that this is a very great figure when one takes into consideration the volume of imports of racehorses. I believe myself that if this is paving legislation for a totalisator monopoly, which is what I suspect it is, it will be in no way wanted by the public. I submit that it would be unfair competition with the bookmakers.
My second main point is that this Bill unfairly discriminates against bookmakers. Here I refer particularly to Clause 1 (4), where permission is given for the Racecourse Betting Control Board to carry on postal cash betting. I believe that unless this facility were a universal facility it certainly would not be understood by the public. I understand from the hon. Member for Dudley and my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton that this would favour universal cash betting by post. I accept that fact, but I cannot accept that this piecemeal approach would be misunderstood throughout our land.

Mr. Astor: My hon. Friend says that exports were not very significant compared with imports. Can he tell the House what were the imports?

Mr. Temple: The only figure which I have got I quote from the Daily Mail of 13th May this year, that imports were £6,200,000.

Mr. Astor: Nonsense.

Mr. Temple: I am quoting the Daily Mail. It may be rubbish, but it was in the Daily Mail of that date. What I will admit is that these figures may be vitiated to a certain extent by the factors which were explained by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton in his speech.
I come to Clause 1 (5). I readily accept the explanation of the hon. Member for Dudley when he says that there is no intention by him or his friends of introducing credit betting shops, but I would point out to him that it would appear


to me that Clause 1 (5), read in conjunction with subsections (3) and (4) of the Clause, would permit the Racecourse Betting Control Board to open these credit betting shops. If I am right in that, and even if I am wrong in that, I would say that in my opinion the opening of betting shops of any description in our country would be a detrimental feature.
I have a reasonable knowledge of the Irish Republic, and I have observed the exterior of betting shops in that country, and I feel that it would certainly be a tragedy if betting shops were permitted to be opened in our main thoroughfares. If one admits that, and betting shops were permitted in our lesser thoroughfares, one might find oneself in the position of a certain authority—and it is doubtful as to what authority is to do the licensing of betting shops—being an authority responsible for permitting betting shops to be in our lesser thoroughfares. It would mean that they might be situated contiguous with good class property and would lower the whole status of the property of the areas in which they were situated.

Mr. Wigg: If the hon. Member has any doubt still about this, after taking the advice he could upon the point, I give him the assurance that I will accept any form of words which will satisfy him and his advisers in order to safeguard against that possibility.

Mr. Temple: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I did say that I accepted what he said in the first instance. I finish my argument on the betting shops by saying that I am sure that for his part that is so, but I submit that under the Bill as drafted there is a possibility of a loophole which may not have occurred to him. May I say in conclusion on this point that in my opinion betting shops if they are sordid and unattractive are not wanted, and if they are attractive they will be seductive and conducive to further and more extensive betting in our country.
Under Clause 2 there is, as the hon. Member for Dudley admitted, a new departure in the betting at fixed odds by the Racecourse Betting Control Board. In subsection (1) of Clause 2 of this Bill a monopoly would be created in this respect. Here I mention in passing that

for many years since the first introduction of the Tote it has been possible for bookmakers to offer to their clients a facility for betting at Tote odds. This facility has not been used to any significant extent, but it would be wrong to take it away from the general bookmaking fraternity and create a copyright—the word used by the hon. Member for Dudley for the Racecourse Betting Control Board in the using of these Tote odds for betting at fixed prices.

Mr. Wigg: I cannot quite follow the hon. Gentleman. He said my explanation was not clear, but his argument is difficult to follow. First he says this facility is not used to any great extent, and then he complains because it is to be taken away.

Mr. Temple: I think I am reasonably consistent there. It will not advantage anyone very much if it is taken away, but I think it is unreasonable to take it away and create a monopoly. However small, I am against monopolies, and I think I can rely on the remarks of the hon. Member for Sutton who agreed that he was against monopolies as well; and this is the creation of a monopoly.

Mr. Eric Johnson: If my hon. Friend is against a monopoly in Tote prices, is he not against the bookmakers' monopoly?

Mr. Temple: As far as I know there is no monopoly or copyright of bookmakers' prices. As we have already heard, the bookmaking fraternity are not licensed and I have never heard of any bookmaker refusing to accept bets. This opens up a serious avenue. A statutory body, the Racecourse Betting Control Board, will be able to make large losses. Tote investors are an associate body of the R.B.C.B., and I think I am correctly quoting that they advertise "Winning accounts welcomed". If they are going to welcome winning accounts at fixed odds, they must be going to pay out more money than they are taking in.

Mr. Wigg: Really.

Mr. Temple: There is no doubt that small pools could be, shall I say, influenced by large investments to make very large dividends payable on a certain horse in a certain race. If the R.B.C.B. were accepting bets at fixed odds, they might be assuming very large liabilities,


and they would find themselves in a difficult position as a statutory body in closing people's accounts. It is quite a different thing for a private bookmaker or a private individual to write to a certain person saying that his account is closed for various reasons, but I do not see how a statutory body, such as the R.B.C.B., could write to its individual clients saying that just because the client is winning money it is going to close his account.

Mr. Astor: A bookmaker does that.

Mr. Temple: There is a difference. A bookmaker is not a statutory body. Clause 2 (2) refers to the creation of offences against this copyright, and these offences can be created both by the layer

and the backer. I can understand that the bookmaking fraternity have a comprehensive knowledge of the betting laws, but the backer will put himself in a position under Clause 2 (2) of being liable to create an offence, with penalties ranging up to a maximum of £500 in certain instances, and going further than that to £750. I would think it wrong that both those parties should be liable to the creation of these new and heavy penalties.

Notice taken that 40 Members were not present;

House counted, and, 40 Members not being present, adjourned at two minutes to Three o'clock till Monday next.